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In this paper, we use A-share listed ﬁrms between 2002 and 2010 to investigate
the relationship between local ﬁscal distress and the investment eﬃciency of
local SOEs, along with the eﬀect of corporate tax payments on this relation-
ship. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between the extent of local SOEs’ overin-
vestment and the ﬁscal distress of the corresponding local government where
the enterprise and this relationship become stronger for ﬁrms that pay fewer
taxes. The pattern of underinvestment among local SOEs was in contrast,
and these relationships do not exist for non-SOEs or central SOEs. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that expanding a ﬁrm’s investment scale leads to an increase in total
taxes paid, including income and turnover taxes, which further result in more
local ﬁscal revenue. Overall, we conclude that local governments have an
incentive to increase ﬁscal revenue when faced with ﬁscal distress by raising
the investment scale of local SOEs and that the incentives and eﬀects of such
interventions appear to be stronger among ﬁrms that contribute less to local
ﬁscal revenue.
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Investment eﬃciency has long been a hot topic in accounting research (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen,
1986; Stulz, 1990; Wei and Liu, 2007), with Jensen (1986) initially investigating the problem using the agency
theory framework, followed by Narayanan (1988) and Malmendler and Tate (2005) exploring the issue from
the perspectives of information asymmetry and managerial overconﬁdence, respectively. The three main
causes of enterprises’ overinvestment are found to be agency problems, information asymmetry, and manage-
rial overconﬁdence. Subsequently, Fazzari et al. (1988), Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), Tang et al. (2007), Xin
et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2009) separately conduct in-depth assessments of the problem from the perspec-
tives of ﬁnancing constraints, management incentives, cash dividends, executive compensation, and manage-
ment background, based on the theories of agency conﬂicts and information asymmetry.
The studies listed above restrict their focus to ﬁrm-level factors, which certainly do not cover all of China.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are controlled by either the central or the local governments at dif-
ferent levels. The agency conﬂicts between the government, which is the biggest shareholder in most circum-
stances, and external minority shareholders are quite diﬀerent from the common conﬂicts between managers
and shareholders and between shareholders and bondholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Yang and Hu (2007), Cheng et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2011) investigate the investment eﬃciency
problem from the perspectives of the speciﬁc institutional environment and government intervention in China.
They ﬁnd that the institutional environment in China and government intervention inﬂuence the relationship
between the factors of ﬁrms’ free cash ﬂow, debt ﬁnancing, cash dividends, management compensation, and
corporate governance and the level of corporate overinvestment, creating a non-negligible factor that leads to
ﬁrms’ overinvestment.
Controlled by the government, SOEs are endowed with the responsibility for assisting the corresponding
regional government in achieving various goals, such as the economic, social, and political goals of boosting
regional economic growth; facilitating increases in regional tax revenues and employment rates; maintaining
social stability; and ensuring that investments in emerging industries ﬂourish. This decreases the focus on the
elementary goal of eﬀective operations, compared to non-SOEs (Chen et al., 2011; Wei and Liu, 2007). SOEs
bear heavy policy burdens that can lead to multiple targets and ineﬃcient operations. Thus, SOEs may suﬀer
from low investment and decreased operational eﬃciency, in addition to low pay performance sensitivity
(PPS) among executives. Studies ﬁnd that there have been incentives for local governments to boost their
regional GDP by forcing the local SOEs under their control to overinvest (Tang et al., 2010) and that such
activity has been an important approach for local bureaucrats to obtain promotions. Moreover, Xue and
Bai (2008) and Chen et al. (2012) both ﬁnd that local governments have an incentive to lift the local employ-
ment rate through overemployment in local SOEs.
Following China’s decentralization reform in the 1980s, the planned economy has disintegrated gradually,
providing local governments with extensive autonomous rights, including the right to control tax revenue. As
a result, local governments acquire ﬁnancial incentives to compete with each other (Jin et al., 2005; Young,
2000). After the 1994 reform of the tax system, tax revenue became a crucial source of local ﬁscal revenue
and ﬁscal health became a core economic and social objective of local governments (Chen et al., 2011),
together with the goal of regional economic development. In addition, it became an important approach to
help local governments to implement their government functions and maintain social stability, along with
the goal of regional employment. Each social and political goal is an important incentive for the local govern-
ment to press political interventions into the operation of local SOEs and the ﬁrms that bear policy burdens
from the government should behave diﬀerently from those without. However, studies on local ﬁscal and ﬁnan-
cial conditions’ inﬂuence over the operation of local SOEs are rare, and this paper aims to ﬁll this gap in the
literature.
The State Council of China issued the Decision of the State Council to Implement Tax Distribution Financial
Management System on December 15, 1993. It announced that every province, including provincial-level
autonomous regions and municipalities, should abandon the present local ﬁscal responsibility system and
switch to the tax distribution ﬁnancial management system on January 1, 1994. The tax categories would
be uniﬁed under the following categories: central tax, local tax, and central-local shared tax. Likewise, a stan-
dardized system of tax returns and transfers from the central to local governments would be gradually estab-
lished,2 which is called the reform of tax system. Under the newly established tax distribution system, tax
returns from the central government constitute a certain portion of local ﬁscal expenditures, ensuring suﬃcient
supply for the needs of local ﬁscal expenditure.3 The dependence on tax returns and transfers from the central
government varies greatly across regions, based on their diﬀerent levels of economic development. According
to the ﬁnancial statistics of each province (including provincial-level autonomous regions and municipalities),
approximately 12.41–86.34% of local ﬁscal revenue comes from tax returns and transfers from the central gov-
ernment, and the levels of each province’s deﬁcit (the gap between ﬁscal revenue and expenditure) vary from
4.91% to 94.7%,4 indicating that tax returns and transfers from the central government constitute a large, non-
negligible portion of local ﬁscal revenue that reﬂects local government’s demand for funds. Thus, we deﬁne a
situation in which a provincial local government faces a deﬁcit based on their corresponding ﬁscal revenue and
expenditure, which requires the assistance of funds from tax returns and transfers from the central government
to pay the post-deﬁcit expenditures prompted by local ﬁscal distress. The level of the deﬁcit and the ratio of tax
returns and transfers from the central government on the local government’s total revenue can then be used as
proxies for the measurement of local ﬁscal distress.
Based on the decentralization reform in the 1980s and the 1994 tax system reform, in this paper, we inves-
tigate the relationship between the level of local ﬁscal distress and the investment eﬃciency of local SOEs,
along with the inﬂuence of total taxes paid by the ﬁrm on the above relationship, using the data of all A-share
listed ﬁrms between 2002 and 2010. The sample is classiﬁed into local SOEs, non-SOEs, and central SOEs for
robustness checks, with Richardson’s (2006) overinvestment model, adjusted based on China’s economic
regions and diﬀerent development levels, measuring the extent of investment distortions. The results show that
the level of local SOEs’ overinvestment (underinvestment) is positively (negatively) related to the extent of cor-
responding local governments’ ﬁscal distress and that paying lower corporate taxes enhances the positive (neg-
ative) relationship between the extent of local ﬁscal distress and ﬁrms’ overinvestment (underinvestment).
These patterns do not exist for non-SOEs. Moreover, following further study, we also ﬁnd that raising ﬁrms’
investment scales leads to an increase in total corporate taxes paid, including both income and turnover taxes,
which further results in higher local ﬁscal revenue. Underinvested ﬁrms should increase their investment level
directly, whereas those that have already overinvested should adjust their production, operation, and capital
structures to match the present investment level before expanding their investment scale. In addition, we per-
form robustness checks with a sample of central SOEs, rather than local SOEs, to rule out alternative expla-
nations, such as the existence of abundant investment opportunities or other factors unrelated to government
intervention or political promotion tournaments, and with 2SLS instead of OLS to rule out the potential for
reverse causality between the dependent and the independent variables. Pearson correlation tests of corporate
taxes paid on adjusted/unadjusted BTD and ETR are used to rule out the alternative approach of increasing
tax revenue through stronger tax enforcement instead of forcing local SOEs to invest more, with tax intensity
rather than the level of corporate tax paid to rule out the competitive explanation that ﬁrms pay fewer taxes,
thereby preserving more money, which can lead to overinvestment. Basu’s (1997) accounting conservatism
model is also used to rule out the possibility of the government helping hand hypothesis.
This paper makes at least four contributions. First, prior studies such as Tang et al. (2010), Zhou (2004),
Xue and Bai (2008) and Chen et al. (2012) study the eﬀect of political burdens on the behavior of SOEs from
the perspectives of economic growth and employment rates, whereas we investigate the eﬀect of government’s
social and political goals on SOEs’ operational behavior from a ﬁnancial perspective, which supplements the
literature on the political burdens from the government that result in ﬁrms’ multiple objectives. Second, we
ﬁnd that local governments have an incentive to increase ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs to expand their
investment scale and that such intervention leads to local SOEs’ overinvestment or a lowering of the level of
underinvestment due to other reasons. Moreover, the local government’s intervention can, to some extent,
2 Refer to the Decision of the State Council to Implement Tax Distribution Financial Management System.
3 Refer to the Decision of the State Council to Implement Tax Distribution Financial Management System.
4 Each percentage is calculated based on statistics from the Financial Year Book of China (2003–2011), and the level of the deﬁcit is
calculated by the ratio of the absolute value of the deﬁcit divided by the corresponding year’s local expenditure.
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result in what is expected by the local government, and that underinvestment leads to ﬁrms paying lower taxes.
Based on the above ﬁnding, we provide theoretical bases and references for the ways in which local govern-
ments make ﬁscal policies and improve the supervisory roles they play in relation to local SOEs. Third, we
provide empirical evidence of the government grabbing hand theory through the perspectives of local public
ﬁnance and enterprise investment. Finally, we oﬀer a new research perspective for the study of ﬁscal issues
through ﬁrm-level aspects.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and describes China’s insti-
tutional background to develop the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and sample
selection procedure. Descriptive statistics and empirical results, including robustness checks and further anal-
ysis, are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature, institutional background and hypotheses development
In the perfect world described byModigliani andMiller (1958), enterprise investment depends on the net pres-
ent value of the project and has nothing to do with other factors. In reality, scholars in ﬁnancial ﬁelds ﬁnd that
Modigliani and Miller’s perfect market theory does not eﬀectively explain actual investment activities. In fact,
some enterprises invest in projects of negative net present value (NPV) (Jensen, 1986; Aggarwal and Samwick,
2006). They conﬁrm that factors such as agency problems (Jensen, 1986), information asymmetry (Myers and
Majluf, 1984), and managerial overconﬁdence (Roll, 1986; Malmendler and Tate, 2005) aﬀect ﬁrms’ investment
decisions. The mainstream view argues that agency problems aﬀect the level of enterprise investment expendi-
ture, further resulting in underinvestment or overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006).
The separation of ownership frommanagement renders the interests of managers and shareholders inconsistent,
and managers make decisions that distract from the shareholders’ primary goal of value maximization for their
ownprivate interests. This results in overinvestmentmost of the time (Jensen andMeckling, 1976; Stulz, 1990). In
contrast, the resources controlled by themanager generally increase with the free cash ﬂow preserved in the ﬁrm,
which brings themmore private beneﬁts andbetter reputations.As a result,managers have an incentive to engage
in empire building (Chen et al., 2011), which results in overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). From another perspective,
information asymmetry scholars suggest that overinvestment ismost likely when insiders havemore information
than shareholders, especially regarding the value of present assets owned by the ﬁrmor the prospective cash ﬂows
of investment projects, in which the ﬁnancing securities of the ﬁrm are probably overvalued or undervalued
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory of managers’ overconﬁdence suggests that overinvestment may be due
to managers’ overconﬁdence in their ability or the ﬁrm’s competitiveness, even though the manager is utterly
loyal to shareholders’ goal of value maximization (Malmendler and Tate, 2005).
The traditional agency theory suggests that agency conﬂicts mainly exist between shareholders and managers
(Berle andMeans, 1932; Jensen andMeckling, 1976) and between shareholders and bondholders (Myers, 1977).
However, studies based on China’s capital markets ﬁnd that there exists a third agency conﬂict, namely that
between the government and the minority shareholders. In most situations, the government is also the biggest
shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2011). On the one hand, the government is an owner of the enter-
prise and obtains beneﬁts from its operational activities, as do other owners. On the other hand, the government
simultaneously acts as society’s administrator, responsible for boosting regional economic development (GDP
growth) to facilitate increases in regional tax revenues and employment rates (Chen et al., 2011; Zhang and
Wang, 2010). This leads to the multiple goals of SOEs, which usually diﬀer from the primary goal of sharehold-
ers’ value maximization (Zhang and Wang, 2010). Moreover, the government may act as the grabbing hand in
pursuing its social and political goals (Frye and Shleifer, 1997), reducing the value of local SOEs by tunneling. To
summarize, all of these activities conﬂict with the interests of minority shareholders.
The literature ﬁnds that local governments have an incentive to boost local GDP growth through overin-
vestment by local SOEs (Tang et al., 2010) and to help local bureaucrats succeed in political promotion tour-
naments – the main criterion for which is GDP growth (Li and Zhou, 2005). In addition, Jin et al. (2005),
Young (2000) and Montinola et al. (1995) suggest that China’s decentralization reform in the 1980s has
created incentives not only for political promotion among local bureaucrats, but also for ﬁscal revenue. Chi-
na’s tax system reform, which began in 1994, speciﬁes that both SOEs and non-SOEs should pay business and
income taxes to the government, declaring an end to a history in which SOEs need not pay taxes under the
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system of ﬁscal contract responsibility. Subsequently, tax revenue has become one of the most important
sources of local ﬁscal revenue and local bureaucrats compete for both local economic growth and tax revenue
(Zhou, 2004). Compared to the central government, local governments control fewer resources and thus have
stronger incentives to seek help from the local SOEs under their control (Chen et al., 2011). Jin et al. (2005)
also suggest that local governments have an incentive to increase local ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs to
increase their investment level.
Based on the ﬁnancial statistics of each province (Table 1), income taxes constitute about 20% of local gov-
ernments’ tax revenue each year, with the remaining 80% represented by turnover taxes, which make up the
vast majority of tax revenue. The objects of taxation for turnover taxes are the amount of transfers generated
by the production and circulation procedures for commodities and the number of turnovers for non-commod-
ities, so increasing a ﬁrm’s investment level ought to result in transfer activities for commodities or turnover
for non-commodities, leading to an increase in turnover taxes. In addition, increasing the investment level
could help to expand a ﬁrm’s scale, given a normal level of investment, thus improving its production capacity,
further raising its proﬁtability, and ultimately increasing the income taxes paid by the ﬁrm. In addition, Jian
and Wong (2010) and Cheung et al. (2008) ﬁnd that compared to central SOEs, it is more common for local
SOEs to transport resources and interests to the local government under which they operate. In terms of non-
SOEs, they are relatively free from the intervention of local governments and thus are less likely to invest in
negative net present value projects for the sake of the government’s social and political goals, such as local
GDP growth, tax revenue, and employment rate factors. Therefore, as the ultimate controllers of local SOEs,
local governments have an incentive to force local SOEs to raise their investment level – thereby achieving
their goals of increasing ﬁscal revenue and the easing of ﬁnancial crises when faced with ﬁnancial distress,
and continuous increases in investment, which inevitably leads to local SOEs’ investment levels becoming mis-
matched with the present production, operation, and capital structures. This can result in an upward bias of
investment scale and, eventually, in overinvestment. Furthermore, the probability and extent of such an
upward bias should be higher when local governments have a stronger incentive to increase investments, lead-
ing to more severe overinvestment of local SOEs.
The above discussion leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. The level of overinvestment for local SOEs is positively related to the extent of local ﬁscal distress,
whereas this relationship does not exist for non-SOEs.
From the perspective of the grabbing hand theory, the government has an incentive to exploit public ﬁrms.
Thus, not only local governments have an incentive to raise ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs under their
control to raise their investment scales when the government faces ﬁnancial distress, which supports H1, but
also the motivation and eﬀect of such intervention should be stronger for ﬁrms that contribute less to local
ﬁnance.
Table 1
Tax revenue structure of local government (provincial level).
Year Income Tax (%) Turnover Tax (%) Turnover Tax
Value-added Tax (%) Business Tax and surcharges
Business Tax (%) Surcharges (%) Sum (%)
2002 20.19 79.81 26.45 40.08 33.46 73.55
2003 16.19 83.81 27.71 39.95 32.33 72.29
2004 17.87 82.13 24.23 44.08 31.69 75.77
2005 18.21 81.79 28.41 42.57 29.01 71.59
2006 18.44 81.56 28.13 42.45 29.42 71.87
2007 19.51 80.49 27.01 42.26 30.73 72.99
2008 20.10 79.90 25.71 41.34 32.95 74.29
2009 18.49 81.51 21.84 43.47 34.69 78.16
2010 18.95 81.05 20.07 43.87 36.06 79.93
Total 19.82 80.18 25.80 41.95 32.25 74.20
Note: The data is based on statistics collected from the Finance Year Book of China (2003–2011).
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In the years before the 1994 tax system reform, the proﬁts generated by SOEs should have been totally or par-
tially turned over to the government. After the 1994 reform, SOEs paid the government business and income
taxes instead of proﬁts for a long period of time. InDecember 2007, theMinistry of Finance and the State-owned
Assets Supervision andAdministration issued theTransient management regulation of the proﬁts generated by the
state-owned capital of central SOEs, which requires central SOEs to turn over the proﬁts they generate. But, local
SOEs are not included in this regulation. So based on the institutional background suggesting that local SOEs
need only pay taxes as opposed to turning over their proﬁts, tax revenue becomes one of the most important
sources of local ﬁscal revenue and a vital factor in balancing local ﬁscal revenue and expenditures. Without turn-
ing over proﬁts, the notion that paying fewer taxes is equivalent to that of contributing less to local ﬁscal revenue.
As a consequence, local governments have an incentive to force local SOEs that contribute less to local ﬁnance to
increase their investment level, leading once again to an upward bias of investment and, ultimately, overinvest-
ment. These predictions are consistent with Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) belief that the government is always
seeking to maximize tax revenue, and thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2. Fewer taxes paid by local SOEs enhance the positive relationship between the level of overinvestment for
local SOEs and the extent of local ﬁscal distress, whereas this relationship does not exist for non-SOEs.
The factors aﬀecting corporate investment are complicated (Jensen, 1986; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Narayanan,
1988; Malmendler and Tate, 2005; Chen et al., 2011, etc.), and they usually behave interactively, resulting in overin-
vestment or underinvestment depending on the interaction eﬀects. The grabbing hand theory suggests that the gov-
ernment extracts value from local SOEs for their social or political sakes through tunneling (Frye and Shleifer, 1997),
and the leviathan hypothesis developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) deﬁnes government as an agent that max-
imizes tax revenue. Thus, local governments have an incentive to force local SOEs under their control into increasing
their investment levels to achieve their goal of increasing ﬁscal revenue. This results in a relief of underinvestment for
ﬁrms that have already underinvested due to other factors, and the eﬀects of such intervention should be stronger
for the ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁnance. Finally, we have our third hypothesis:
H3. For underinvested ﬁrms, the extent of the local government’s ﬁscal distress mitigates the level of local
SOEs’ underinvestment, and this negative relationship is stronger for ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes, whereas this
relationship does not exist for non-SOEs.
3. Research design
3.1. Model construction and variable description
3.1.1. Overinvestment model
We construct our overinvestment model following Richardson (2006) and adjust it based on regional eco-
nomic eﬀects, LocalEco, according to the striking diﬀerences in investment opportunities across regions, see
Model (1):
Investi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Growi;t1 þ b2Levi;t1 þ b3Cashi;t1 þ b4Agei;t1 þ b5Sizei;t1 þ b6Reti;t1
þ b7Investi;t1 þ
X
Industry þ
X
Year þ
X
LocalEcoþ e ð1Þ
In Model (1), Investi,t measures the investment level in year t, and the variables on the right are all measured
in year t  1, with Growi,t1 representing growth opportunities, Levi,t1 representing the debt-to-asset ratio,
Cashi,t1 representing cash ﬂow, Agei,t1 representing the time in years since the ﬁrm went public, Sizei,t1
representing corporate scale, Reti,t1 representing stock returns and Investi,t1 representing the investment
level. We also use R Industry, R Year, and R LocalEco to control for industry, year, and regional eﬀects,
respectively. The regions comprise the east coastal, central, and the western frontier areas,5 representing the
5 The east coastal areas include the provinces and provincial-level autonomous regions and municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The central areas comprise
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The western frontier areas include Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.
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three economic regions of China. The residual e in the model refers to the level of overinvestment or under-
investment, with positive or negative values, respectively. We deﬁne overinvestment as OverInvi,t and the abso-
lute value of underinvestment as UnderInvi,t with a larger value to represent a more severe underinvestment
situation.
Finally, regarding the model’s systematic errors, there must be some diﬀerence between the predicted value
and the corresponding observed value, and not all of the gaps between these two values are necessarily over-
investment or underinvestment. Therefore, we select the observations that are larger than the tenth percentile
of OverInvi,t and UnderInvi,t as our research sample.
3.1.2. The empirical model
We construct Model (2) to test H1 and Model (3) to test H2 and H3. The deﬁnitions and descriptions of the
variables are presented in Table 2. We perform cluster treatments on provincial eﬀects.
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t1 þ b2Sizei;t þ b3Roai;t þ b4Fcfi;t þ b5Duali;t þ b6Exeowni;t
þ b7Herfi;t þ b8Dividi;t þ b9Debti;t þ b10Salaryi;t þ b11GDPgtht
þ b12GovIntvnt þ
X
Industry þ
X
Year þ e ð2Þ
In Model (2), we construct two proxies for the measurement of local ﬁscal distress. In measuring corporate
ﬁnancial distress, Wu and Lu (2001) deﬁne a ﬁrm being ST or PT as an indicator of ﬁnancial distress. Dahiya
et al. (2003) deﬁne ﬁnancial distress as a ﬁrm being unable to pay its matured debt with suﬃcient cash ﬂow.
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions and descriptions.
Variable Name Deﬁnition and Description
Panel A: Dependent Variables
OverInvi,t (UnderInvi,t) Overinvestment (Underinvestment) The gap between the observed value and the predicted value of
corporate investment
Panel B: Independent Variables
Distress1i,t-1 Financial distress of local
government
[(Local Expenditure - Local Revenue)/ Local Revenue] 100%
Distress1i,t-1N_Taxi,t-1 The interaction of Distress1i,t-1 and
N_Taxi,t-1
The interaction of ﬁnancial distress and negative taxes paid
Distress2i,t-1 Financial distress of local
government
(Transfers from Central Government/ Total Revenue) 100%
Distress2i,t-1N_Taxi,t-1 The interaction of Distress1i,t-1 and
N_Taxi,t-1
The interaction of ﬁnancial distress and negative taxes paid
N_Taxi,t-1 Negative corporate taxes paid Negative logarithm of the sum of Income Tax Expense and
Business Tax and Surcharges on income statement
Panel C: Control Variables
Sizei,t Scale of the ﬁrm Logarithm of total assets
Roai,t Return on total assets Ratio of ﬁrm’s net proﬁt to total assets
Fcfi,t Free cash ﬂow Ratio of free cash ﬂow to total assets
Duali,t Duality One if the board chairman is also the CEO of the corporation,
otherwise zero
Exeowni,t Management stock ownership Shareholding ratio of management
Herfi,t Ownership concentration Sum of shareholdings of top three shareholders
Dividi,t Cash dividend per share Ratio of cash dividends on total shares outstanding
Debti,t Long-term debt ratio (Long-term loan + Long-term bonds payable +Long-term account
payable)/ Total assets
Salaryi,t Executive salary Logarithm of the sum of top three managers’ salaries
GDPgtht GDP growth GDP growth rate compared to the previous year
GovIntvnt Index of reducing government
intervention to enterprises
The item “1c reducing government intervention to enterprises” in
Fan Gang marketization index
Industry Industry Industry dummy variables
Year Year Year dummy variables
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Liao and Chen (2007) classify ﬁnancial distress as a ﬁrm’s EBITDA being less than interest expense for two
consecutive years, or becoming insolvent. One of the common features of these corporate ﬁnancial distress
criteria is that the ﬁrm cannot make end meet. Similarly, government ﬁnance includes ﬁscal revenue and
expenditure, with a ﬁscal expenditure larger than the revenue referred to as a ﬁscal deﬁcit. Regarding the
determination of corporate ﬁnancial distress, we deﬁne the existence of a ﬁscal deﬁcit to be the criterion of
government ﬁscal distress. Moreover, the extent of ﬁscal distress is considered more severe if the government
has more ﬁscal expenditures than their counterparts with the same ﬁscal deﬁcit. As a result, we use the per-
centage of ﬁscal deﬁcit on Local Expenditure of the local government to measure the extent of local ﬁscal dis-
tress, deﬁned as Distress1. From the perspective of ﬁscal revenue alone, in addition to Taxes and Non-tax
revenue, the item of local Total Revenue also consists of Transfers from Central Government (Including Tax
Returns), Revenue of Loans from National Debt, and Balance Revenue of Last Year, etc., comprising the Total
Revenue – the amount equivalent to that of Total Expenditure, comprising Local Expenditure and other items
such as Transfers to Central Government and Added Budgetary Revolving Fund. Transfers from Central Gov-
ernment (Including Tax Returns) generally constitutes a great portion (from 12.41% to 86.34%) of the govern-
ment’s Total Revenue, which serves as supplementary funds when the local government cannot make ends
meet. Therefore, we argue that the ratio of Transfers from Central Government (Including Tax Returns) on
Total Revenue is a good proxy for the local government’s ﬁscal distress, demonstrated as Distress2.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the objects of taxation for turnover taxes, which constitute 80% of local revenue,
are the amount of transfers generated by the commodity production and circulation procedures and the
amount of turnovers for non-commodities. Thus, it increases with corporate investment. In terms of income
taxes, it is paid only after operating proﬁts are generated, so there is usually a time lag between the increase in
corporate investment and the corresponding payment of income taxes. However, since income tax comprises
only 20% of total tax revenue for the local government, the problem of the time lag is not severe, and only
1 year lagged values of Distress are needed.
Incorporating the interaction term of local ﬁscal distress and corporate taxes paid into Model (2), we obtain
Model (3).
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t1 þ b2Distressi;t1 N Taxi;t1 þ b3N Taxi;t1 þ b4Sizei;t
þ b5Roai;t þ b6Fcfi;t þ b7Duali;t þ b8Exeowni;t þ b9Herfi;t þ b10Dividi;t
þ b11Debti;t þ b12Salaryi;t þ b13GDPgtht þ b14GovIntvnt þ
X
Industry
þ
X
Year þ e ð3Þ
Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) argue that all tax revenue is collected by the local government and then shared
between the local and the central governments, so local governments in China have an incentive to reduce their
eﬀorts on the types of tax they must share with the central government under China’s tax distribution system
established after 1994. Wu et al. (2011) demonstrate that income taxes from enterprises, business taxes from
sales and services and personal income taxes constitute local governments’ major tax revenue. Under China’s
tax law, Business Tax, Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax, Contract Tax, Housing Property Tax, Vehi-
cle and Vessel Usage Tax, Stamp Tax, Tax on the Use of Arable Land, Tobacco Tax, Land Value-added Tax,
and Urban Land Using Tax, etc., comprise local governments’ regular revenue – 100% of which is turned over
to local governments along with Resource Tax, whereas Income Tax and Value-added Tax should be shared
between local and central governments with 40% and 25%, respectively, taken away by the central govern-
ment. In terms of the income statement, Business Tax and Surcharges consist of all tax items belonging to local
governments’ regular revenue, and Income Tax refers to the income taxes currently paid by the ﬁrm. Although
the content of Value-added Tax is not provided in the income statement, it is not signiﬁcant in this study
because Business Tax and Surcharges account for 75% of the total turnover taxes, which constitute 80% of
total local tax revenue, leaving the remaining 25% to be Value-added Tax.
Consequently, the Business Tax and Surcharges on the income statement, to some extent, could be a good
proxy for turnover taxes with the sum of Business Tax and Surcharges and Income Tax properly measuring the
taxes paid by the ﬁrm. The amount of taxes actually paid by the ﬁrm is usually aﬀected by items such as
Deferred Income Tax Assets, Deferred Income Tax Liabilities, and Tax Returns, etc., with Tax Payments on
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the income statement consisting of Payment of Previous Period Due,Payable Tax, and Prepaid Tax. Thus, it is
not appropriate to measure the amount of corporate taxes paid with Tax Payable on the balance sheet or with
Tax Payments on the income statement. The sum of Income Tax Expense and Business Tax and Surcharges on
the income statement appropriately measures the current taxes paid by the ﬁrm, and we use its negative log-
arithm value as a proxy for corporate taxes paid, denoted by N_Tax, to properly demonstrate the relationship
in H2. Hence, we have a higher value of N_Tax with lower corporate taxes paid and vice versa.
For details regarding the selection of the control variables in Models (2) and (3), please refer to the
Introduction.
3.2. Data source and sample procedure
We collect our ﬁnancial data from the Finance Year Book of China (2003–2011) and all other ﬁrm-level data
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Our sample comprises all A-share
ﬁrms between 2002 and 2010, eliminating observations that are as follows: (i) attributed to the ﬁnancial indus-
try, (ii) listed less than 1 year, or (iii) have missing data. Finally, we obtain 10244 ﬁrm-year observations and
winsorize the sample at the 1% and 99% levels.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for local government ﬁscal distress. The minimum and maximum
values for Distress1 are 4.91% and 94.70%, respectively, and those for Distress2 are 12.41% and 86.34%,
respectively. The results show that there is no great diﬀerence between the two proxies of Distress1 and
Distress2.
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics for all of the variables. Tables 5 and 6 provide descriptive statistics for
the subsamples of ﬁrm-years with overinvestment and underinvestment and for the subsamples of local SOEs
and non-SOEs, respectively.
The results of the two-tailed t-tests shown in Table 5 reveal that the majority of variables for overinvested
ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that for their underinvested counterparts and that overinvested ﬁrms are
more concentrated in regions with more severe ﬁscal distress, compared to underinvested ﬁrms. The results of
the two-tailed t-tests shown in Table 6 display that each variable for local SOEs is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
that for non-SOEs, except for GDP growth. Likewise, local SOEs are more concentrated in regions with more
severe ﬁscal distress, compared to non-SOEs.
Table 7 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for all of the variables. The results show that the absolute
values of the correlations between most of the control variables are less than 0.3, which suggests that there are
no collinearity problems between the control variables. Moreover, the correlation between the two proxies of
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for local ﬁscal distress.
Distress1 (%) Distress2 (%)
Year Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max Mean Median S.D Min Max
2002 898 38.75 31.36 18.87 15.02 94.70 37.18 27.55 13.98 20.17 85.16
2003 988 38.27 32.63 17.51 18.58 94.41 36.79 28.15 13.76 21.23 84.77
2004 1062 39.19 35.45 17.49 17.12 92.51 38.52 31.70 15.06 19.94 86.34
2005 1118 35.93 26.81 19.48 13.14 93.51 33.83 26.77 16.15 16.58 84.31
2006 1093 34.56 26.03 20.79 11.80 92.73 34.02 26.98 16.70 16.01 78.59
2007 1061 34.35 25.93 22.74 4.91 92.69 34.77 25.98 18.32 13.69 77.92
2008 1046 34.43 27.64 23.33 6.22 93.46 32.95 26.94 18.81 12.41 75.27
2009 1387 38.67 32.72 22.29 12.61 93.60 34.20 30.13 18.20 14.18 79.02
2010 1591 36.46 32.07 21.61 13.00 93.35 32.44 28.63 17.16 15.21 76.59
Total 10244 36.73 32.07 20.79 4.91 94.70 34.76 28.63 16.80 12.41 86.34
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Distress1 and Distress2 is 0.9864, statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, indicating that these two proxies are
consistent measures of the same variable.
4.2. Empirical results
Table 8 shows the regression results for local ﬁscal distress and the extent of overinvestment among local
SOEs and non-SOEs. The ﬁndings suggest that the coeﬃcients of Distress1 and Distress2 for local SOEs are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, whereas those for non-SOEs are not signiﬁcant at all,
which is consistent with H1.
Table 9 reports the results of the eﬀect of corporate taxes paid on the positive relationship between local
ﬁscal distress and the level of overinvestment demonstrated in Table 8. The results show that the coeﬃcients
of Distress1  N_Tax and Distress2  N_Tax for local SOEs are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, indicating that lower taxes paid by local SOEs strengthens the positive rela-
tionship between local ﬁscal distress and the extent of their overinvestment, while those for non-SOEs are not
signiﬁcant at all, which is consistent with H2.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for all variables for overinvestment and underinvestment groups.
OverInv UnderInv Two-tailed
Variable Obs Mean Median S.D Obs Mean Median S.D t-test
Distress1 3369 37.25 32.72 20.74 6875 36.48 32.05 20.80 1.7570⁎
Distress2 3369 35.24 29.65 16.71 6875 34.52 28.63 16.83 2.0465⁎⁎
Size 3369 21.19 21.11 1.00 6875 21.54 21.44 1.06 15.9115⁎⁎⁎
Roa 3369 0.04 0.04 0.07 6875 0.03 0.03 0.06 5.2949⁎⁎⁎
Fcf 3357 0.04 0.07 0.17 6859 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.0616
Dual 3369 0.15 0.00 0.35 6875 0.13 0.00 0.33 2.7432⁎⁎⁎
Exeown 2955 1.35 0.00 5.51 6169 0.88 0.00 4.26 4.5184⁎⁎⁎
Herf 3033 50.04 50.96 14.68 6313 50.04 50.69 15.21 0.0088
Divid 3020 0.18 0.14 0.16 6285 0.20 0.15 0.18 5.1693⁎⁎⁎
Debt 3338 0.07 0.03 0.10 6771 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.3471
Salary 3343 13.22 13.27 0.82 6811 13.35 13.39 0.87 6.7039⁎⁎⁎
GDPgth 3369 14.92 16.24 6.77 6875 15.87 17.02 6.64 6.7828⁎⁎⁎
GovIntvn 2630 6.21 6.85 3.00 5670 6.18 6.85 3.08 0.8599
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for all variables.
Variable Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max
Distress1 10,244 36.73 32.07 20.79 4.91 94.70
Distress2 10,244 34.76 28.63 16.80 12.41 86.34
Size 10,244 21.42 21.32 1.05 19.07 24.60
Roa 10,244 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.20
Fcf 10,216 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.63 0.36
Dual 10,244 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Exeown 9124 1.03 0.00 4.70 0.00 32.98
Herf 9346 50.04 50.76 15.04 16.40 84.55
Divid 9305 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.90
Debt 10,109 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.45
Salary 10,154 13.31 13.35 0.86 11.16 15.30
GDPgth 10,244 15.56 16.70 6.69 0.00 34.05
GovIntvn 10,244 6.19 6.85 3.05 12.95 10.13
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Table 10 presents the results of the relationship between local ﬁscal distress and the extent of underinvest-
ment for local SOEs, and the eﬀect of corporate taxes paid on this relationship. The results show that the coef-
ﬁcients of Distress1 and Distress2 in columns 1 and 2 and Distress1  N_Tax and Distress2  N_Tax in
columns 3 and 4 for local SOEs are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant, whereas those for non-SOEs
shown in columns 5–8 are not signiﬁcant at all, indicating that local ﬁscal distress helps mitigate the extent
of underinvestment for underinvested local SOEs and that this eﬀect is stronger for the ﬁrms that pay fewer
taxes, whereas this pattern does not exist for non-SOEs, which is consistent with H3.
In summary, the results shown in Tables 8–10 suggest that local ﬁscal distress is positively related to the
extent of local SOEs’ overinvestment and that this relationship is stronger when lower taxes are paid by local
SOEs. Meanwhile, local ﬁscal distress is negatively related to the extent of local SOEs’ underinvestment, and
this negative relationship is also stronger when lower taxes are paid by local SOEs. However, the above rela-
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for all variables for local SOE and non-SOE groups.
Local SOEs Non-SOEs Two-tailed
Variable Obs Mean Median S.D Obs Mean Median S.D t-test
Distress1 4284 38.06 34.46 20.46 4016 35.19 26.03 20.78 6.3549⁎⁎⁎
Distress2 4284 35.99 34.21 16.44 4016 33.26 26.95 16.92 7.4721⁎⁎⁎
Size 4284 21.61 21.53 1.01 4016 21.08 21.01 0.94 24.8201⁎⁎⁎
Roa 4284 0.03 0.03 0.06 4016 0.03 0.03 0.08 1.9943⁎⁎
Fcf 4275 0.06 0.06 0.13 8275 0.03 0.06 0.17 8.3922⁎⁎⁎
Dual 4284 0.11 0.00 0.31 4016 0.19 0.00 0.40 11.0027⁎⁎⁎
Exeown 3792 0.12 0.00 1.27 3597 2.43 0.00 7.09 19.7046⁎⁎⁎
Herf 3868 51.27 52.33 15.14 3701 47.29 47.35 14.65 11.6081⁎⁎⁎
Divid 3856 0.21 0.16 0.18 3681 0.17 0.13 0.15 9.5336⁎⁎⁎
Debt 4225 0.08 0.04 0.10 3975 0.06 0.01 0.09 10.5959⁎⁎⁎
Salary 4245 13.29 13.35 0.84 3989 13.26 13.27 0.87 1.8752⁎
GDPgth 4284 15.47 16.76 6.85 4016 15.58 16.94 6.51 0.7570
GovIntvn 4284 6.06 6.58 3.05 4016 6.47 6.91 3.18 5.9001⁎⁎⁎
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 7
The Pearson correlation matrix for all variables.
Distress1 Distress2 Size Roa Fcf Dual Exeown Herf Divid Debt Salary GDPgthGovIntvn
Distress1 1.000
Distress2 0.986⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Size 0.063⁎⁎⁎0.049⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Roa 0.007 0.009 0.113⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Fcf 0.009 0.012 0.074⁎⁎⁎0.051⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Dual 0.037⁎⁎⁎0.041⁎⁎⁎0.071⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.012 1.000
Exeown 0.116⁎⁎⁎0.132⁎⁎⁎0.124⁎⁎⁎ 0.017 0.000 0.242⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Herf 0.024⁎⁎ 0.026⁎⁎ 0.116⁎⁎⁎ 0.023⁎⁎ 0.071⁎⁎⁎0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Divid 0.017 0.016 0.466⁎⁎⁎ 0.036⁎⁎⁎ 0.091⁎⁎⁎0.059⁎⁎⁎0.015 0.130⁎⁎⁎1.000
Debt 0.089⁎⁎⁎ 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 0.322⁎⁎⁎0.001 0.057⁎⁎⁎0.056⁎⁎⁎0.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.036⁎⁎⁎0.287⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Salary 0.282⁎⁎⁎0.294⁎⁎⁎ 0.411⁎⁎⁎ 0.063⁎⁎⁎ 0.021⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.085⁎⁎⁎0.049⁎⁎⁎0.255⁎⁎⁎ 0.069⁎⁎⁎1.000
GDPgth 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.068⁎⁎⁎0.067⁎⁎⁎0.010 0.016 0.006 0.019⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎0.052⁎⁎⁎0.007 0.017 1.000
GovIntvn0.738⁎⁎⁎0.727⁎⁎⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎ 0.006 0.006 0.028⁎⁎ 0.107⁎⁎⁎0.022⁎ 0.043⁎⁎⁎0.078⁎⁎⁎0.256⁎⁎⁎0.007 1.000
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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tionships do not exist for non-SOEs. Therefore, we conclude from the empirical results that there is a positive
relationship between the level of local ﬁscal distress and the extent of local SOEs’ investment expenditure, such
that local governments have an incentive to boost tax revenue by forcing the local SOEs under their control to
raise investment scales. Local governments also have an incentive to exert greater pressure on the ﬁrms that
contribute less to local ﬁscal revenue (those who pay fewer taxes), whereas the investment behavior of non-
SOEs is of no relevance to local ﬁnances.
4.3. Further analysis
Based on the grabbing hand theory, local governments faced with ﬁscal distress have an incentive to
increase ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs to raise their investment expenditure, and the motivation and
eﬀect of such intervention are stronger among ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁnances – in line with previ-
ously stated logic. However, lower investment eﬃciency due to overinvestment or underinvestment would the-
oretically lower a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, leading to less income tax paid by the ﬁrm. Turnover taxes, which make
up local governments’ major tax revenue, are aﬀected by the amount of transfers generated by the commodity
Table 8
Local Fiscal distress and corporate overinvestment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons 0.8585⁎⁎ 0.8335⁎⁎ 0.3104 0.2981
(0.029) (0.030) (0.341) (0.356)
Distress1t1 0.0021
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002
(0.007) (0.704)
Distress2t1 0.0022
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001
(0.009) (0.879)
Sizet 0.0512
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0504⁎⁎⁎ 0.0287⁎⁎ 0.0288⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.049) (0.049)
Roat 0.3599 0.3641 0.0834 0.0837
(0.129) (0.122) (0.603) (0.602)
Fcft 0.1768 0.1795 0.0715
⁎ 0.0714⁎
(0.202) (0.195) (0.084) (0.085)
Dualt 0.0057 0.0059 0.0063 0.0067
(0.844) (0.838) (0.666) (0.649)
Exeownt 0.0004 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001
(0.844) (0.770) (0.907) (0.926)
Herft 0.0041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0041⁎⁎⁎ 0.0027⁎⁎ 0.0027⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017)
Dividt 0.1249 0.1250 0.0835 0.0833
(0.206) (0.206) (0.383) (0.384)
Debtt 0.3644
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3694⁎⁎⁎ 0.1295 0.1297
(0.003) (0.002) (0.285) (0.282)
Salaryt 0.0423⁎⁎⁎ 0.0426⁎⁎⁎ 0.0285⁎⁎ 0.0289⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.018)
GDPgtht 0.0041 0.0042 0.0049
⁎⁎ 0.0050⁎⁎
(0.119) (0.111) (0.049) (0.045)
GovIntvnt 0.0018 0.0001 0.0043 0.0050
(0.676) (0.982) (0.257) (0.206)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 1134 1134 977 977
adj. R2 0.137 0.135 0.074 0.074
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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production and circulation procedure and the number of turnovers for non-commodities. However, a decline
in proﬁtability leads to a reduction in free cash ﬂow and even ﬁnancial distress, which impairs ﬁrms’ commod-
ity production, distribution, and operations to ﬁnally reduce local turnover revenue. Therefore, it is doubtful
that local governmental intervention has achieved the prospective goal of increasing ﬁscal revenue by forcing
local SOEs to raise their investment level, resulting in overinvestment or a reduction in underinvestment, given
that intervention induces a bad eﬀect on corporate performance. The following section addresses these issues.
We construct a set of nested models (Model (4)) and perform F-tests to examine whether there is a signif-
icant diﬀerence between the eﬀects of actual and normal corporate investment levels on the taxes paid to the
government. The eﬀect of the normal investment level on corporate taxes paid is signiﬁcantly greater than that
of the actual level if the coeﬃcient a2 is signiﬁcantly larger than a1 in Model (4.1). Similarly, Model (5) is
Table 9
Eﬀect of corporate taxes paid on local ﬁscal distress and corporate overinvestment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons 1.7517⁎⁎⁎ 1.8504⁎⁎⁎ 0.7797⁎ 0.7163
(0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.106)
Distress1t1 0.0131
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0023
(0.005) (0.519)
Distress1t1  N_Taxt1 0.0007⁎⁎ 0.0001
(0.011) (0.509)
Distress2t1 0.0170
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005
(0.004) (0.898)
Distress2t1  N_Taxt1 0.0009⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000
(0.007) (0.876)
N_Taxt1 0.0701
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0638⁎⁎⁎ 0.0494⁎⁎⁎ 0.0532⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004)
Sizet 0.1331
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1328⁎⁎⁎ 0.0772⁎⁎⁎ 0.0779⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006)
Roat 0.9235
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9354⁎⁎⁎ 0.1514 0.1514
(0.001) (0.001) (0.464) (0.466)
Fcft 0.2296
⁎ 0.2319⁎ 0.0692 0.0710
(0.079) (0.075) (0.131) (0.119)
Dualt 0.0131 0.0127 0.0068 0.0074
(0.634) (0.646) (0.640) (0.610)
Exeownt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.971) (0.983) (0.980) (0.992)
Herft 0.0038
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0038⁎⁎⁎ 0.0025⁎⁎ 0.0026⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
Dividt 0.0518 0.0524 0.1318 0.1317
(0.565) (0.559) (0.187) (0.189)
Debtt 0.2982
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3040⁎⁎⁎ 0.1261 0.1266
(0.005) (0.004) (0.291) (0.287)
Salaryt 0.0263⁎⁎ 0.0265⁎⁎ 0.0132 0.0137
(0.044) (0.042) (0.269) (0.250)
GDPgtht 0.0058
⁎⁎ 0.0060⁎⁎⁎ 0.0053⁎⁎ 0.0052⁎⁎
(0.011) (0.009) (0.045) (0.043)
GovIntvnt 0.0015 0.0001 0.0043 0.0048
(0.723) (0.974) (0.241) (0.198)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 1134 1134 977 977
adj. R2 0.224 0.223 0.117 0.117
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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constructed to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the eﬀects of actual and normal cor-
porate investment levels on corporate performance. We construct three measurements of taxes in Model (4).
One is for total taxes paid Tax_total, which is identical to that in Model (3), and the other two are for the
levels of turnover Tax_turnover and income Tax_income taxes, with Business Tax and Surcharges and Income
Tax Expense on the income statement as the proxies, respectively. Corporate performance in Model (5) has
two proxies: return on assets (Roa) and operating proﬁt margin (Opr), respectively.
The independent variables in the two sets of nested models are the level of actual corporate investment
(Invact) and that of normal investment (Invnor) along with their sum (Invact + Invnor), in which the normal
investment level is calculated with the overinvestment model, namely Model (1). The control variables in
the two sets of nested models are as follows: ﬁrm size (Size), return on total assets (Roa), ﬁnancial leverage
Table 10
Local Fiscal Distress, Corporate Underinvestment and the Eﬀect of Corporate Taxes Paid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons 0.1960⁎⁎⁎ 0.2442⁎⁎⁎ 0.1995⁎⁎⁎ 0.2629⁎⁎⁎ 0.3827⁎⁎⁎ 0.3571⁎⁎⁎ 0.3835⁎⁎⁎ 0.3666⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distress1t1 0.0001⁎ 0.0015⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000 0.0001
(0.061) (0.003) (0.884) (0.944)
Distress1t1  N_Taxt1 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000
(0.006) (0.929)
Distress2t1 0.0002⁎⁎ 0.0020⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000 0.0004
(0.030) (0.001) (0.929) (0.743)
Distress2t1  N_Taxt1 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000
(0.003) (0.736)
N_Taxt1 0.0032 0.0041
⁎ 0.0041⁎ 0.0047⁎⁎
(0.121) (0.059) (0.058) (0.045)
Sizet 0.0028 0.0024 0.0028 0.0024 0.0125⁎⁎⁎ 0.0089⁎⁎⁎ 0.0125⁎⁎⁎ 0.0088⁎⁎⁎
(0.164) (0.392) (0.168) (0.402) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Roat 0.0479⁎ 0.0494⁎ 0.0477⁎ 0.0494⁎ 0.0110 0.0064 0.0110 0.0064
(0.054) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.621) (0.766) (0.620) (0.765)
Fcft 0.1321⁎⁎⁎ 0.1322⁎⁎⁎ 0.1321⁎⁎⁎ 0.1324⁎⁎⁎ 0.1347⁎⁎⁎ 0.1345⁎⁎⁎ 0.1347⁎⁎⁎ 0.1347⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0020 0.0018 0.0019 0.0017 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0007
(0.707) (0.743) (0.717) (0.749) (0.995) (0.877) (0.997) (0.870)
Exeownt 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎
(0.118) (0.134) (0.121) (0.135) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Herft 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.897) (0.958) (0.866) (0.936) (0.442) (0.495) (0.441) (0.496)
Dividt 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0218
⁎ 0.0260⁎⁎ 0.0218⁎ 0.0259⁎⁎
(0.911) (0.919) (0.904) (0.904) (0.090) (0.041) (0.090) (0.041)
Debtt 0.0409
⁎⁎ 0.0400⁎ 0.0407⁎⁎ 0.0394⁎ 0.0441 0.0430 0.0441 0.0430
(0.042) (0.051) (0.043) (0.054) (0.148) (0.163) (0.148) (0.162)
Salaryt 0.0051⁎⁎ 0.0051⁎⁎ 0.0052⁎⁎ 0.0053⁎⁎ 0.0038 0.0029 0.0038 0.0029
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.142) (0.270) (0.142) (0.266)
GDPgtht 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0008
⁎ 0.0007 0.0008⁎
(0.795) (0.888) (0.811) (0.908) (0.145) (0.088) (0.142) (0.088)
GovIntvnt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.830) (0.835) (0.904) (0.894) (0.888) (0.872) (0.834) (0.833)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2190 2190 2190 2190 1961 1961 1961 1961
adj. R2 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.158 0.160 0.158 0.160
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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ratio (Lev), capital intensity (ratio of ﬁxed assets on total assets, CapInt), inventory intensity (ratio of inven-
tory on total assets, InvInt), intangible asset intensity (ratio of intangible assets on total assets, IntInt), invest-
ment opportunities (ratio of corporate market value on corporate book value, MB), ownership concentration
(the shareholding of the ﬁrst majority shareholder, Herf), CEO duality (Dual), corporate growth opportunities
(Growth), and free cash ﬂow (Fcf). Our selection of the control variables follows Zimmerman (1983), Derashid
and Zhang (2003), Porcano (1986) and Gupta and Newberry (1997). Given the endogeneity problem between
the control variables, we use 1-year lagged values of ﬁrm size, return on total assets and ﬁnancial leverage
ratios instead of current values.
Tax ¼ a0 þ a1Invact þ a2Invnor þ a3L Sizeþ a4L Roaþ a5L Levþ a6CapInt
þa7InvInt þ a8IntInt þ a9MBþ
P
Industry þP Year þ e ð4:1Þ
Tax ¼ b0 þ b1ðInvact þ InvnorÞ þ b2L Sizeþ b3L Roaþ b4L Levþ b5CapInt
þb6InvInt þ b7IntInt þ b8MBþ
P
Industry þP Year þ e ð4:2Þ
8>><
>>:
ð4Þ
RoaðOprÞ ¼ a0 þ a1Invact þ a2Invnor þ a3L Sizeþ a4L Roaþ a5L Lev
þa6Herf þ a7Dualþ a8Growthþ a9Fcf þ a10CapInt þ a11MBþ
P
Industry þP Year þ e ð5:1Þ
RoaðOprÞ ¼ b0 þ b1ðInvact þ InvnorÞ þ b2L Sizeþ b3L Roaþ b4L Levþ b5Herf
þb6Dualþ b7Growthþ b8Fcf þ b9CapInt þ b10MBþ
P
Industry þP Year þ e ð5:2Þ
8>><
>>:
ð5Þ
Table 11 demonstrates the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of the level of actual investment and that of normal invest-
ment, as calculated with the overinvestment model (Model (1)), on corporate taxes paid. Due to this paper’s
length constraints, Table 11 only shows the empirical results of Model (4.1).
Table 11 reveals the following details. The coeﬃcients of Invact in the whole sample and two subsamples are
all signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that an increase in actual investment does lead to an increase in both
income and turnover taxes paid by the ﬁrm. For the turnover taxes (Tax_turnover) in each sample, none of
the coeﬃcients for Invnor are statistically signiﬁcant, while those for Invact are all signiﬁcantly larger than those
for Invnor, with F-values of 8.74, 4.24, and 5.08, respectively, and p-values of 0.0031, 0.0395, and 0.0242,
respectively. This suggests that turnover taxes paid by ﬁrms increase as actual corporate investment increases,
but are irrelevant in relation to corporate investment eﬃciency. For income taxes (Tax_income) in the whole
sample and the underinvestment subsample, the coeﬃcients for Invnor are all signiﬁcantly larger than those
forInvact, with F-values of 3.51 and 5.36, respectively, and p-values of 0.0612 and 0.0206, respectively. The
coeﬃcients for Invnor and Invact in the overinvestment subsample are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, with an F-value
of 0.04 and a p-value of 0.8477, indicating that the income taxes paid by underinvested ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly
lower than those paid by their normally invested counterparts with the same investment scale and that over-
invested ﬁrms do not pay more income taxes than their normally invested counterparts with the same invest-
ment scale.
These empirical results suggest that a higher investment level generally helps increase both income and
turnover taxes paid by ﬁrms, but investment eﬃciency greatly inﬂuences corporate taxes paid. Speciﬁcally,
for total taxes and income taxes, overinvestment does not induce more tax paid to the government than
the normal level, whereas underinvested ﬁrms pay fewer income taxes than their normally invested counter-
parts with the same investment scale. Turnover taxes are positively related to the actual investment level
but unrelated to the normal investment level, consistent with the theoretical analysis that the turnover taxes
generated by a ﬁrm are irrelevant to its investment eﬃciency, but positively related to the level of actual
investment.
Table A1 presents the diﬀerences in the eﬀects of actual and normal investment levels on corporate perfor-
mance. Due to length restrictions, Table A1 only shows the empirical results for Model (5.1).
Table A1 shows that the coeﬃcients of Invact and Invnor are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant in each
group, and the coeﬃcients for each Invnor are all signiﬁcantly larger than those for the corresponding Invact.
The results suggest that although an increase in the levels of actual and normal investment both lead to
improvements in corporate performance, the performance improvements in underinvested ﬁrms are signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than those observed in normal-level ﬁrms with the same investment scale. The results also
X. Liao, Y. Liu / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147 133
indicate that the performances of overinvested and underinvested ﬁrms are worse than those of normally
invested ﬁrms with the same investment scale.
Raising a ﬁrm’s investment scale increases local ﬁscal revenue by increasing the taxes paid by ﬁrms, and it
results in improved corporate performance. Speciﬁcally, turnover taxes are not aﬀected by corporate invest-
ment eﬃciency, whereas total and income taxes are greatly aﬀected by corporate investment eﬃciency. Under-
invested ﬁrms pay much fewer income taxes than their normal-level counterparts, but there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the income taxes paid by overinvested ﬁrms and those paid by normal-level invested ﬁrms
with the same investment scale. This suggests that local governments should increase their tax revenue by
increasing the investment scales of underinvested ﬁrms to normal levels and by helping overinvested ﬁrms
adjust their production, operation, and capital structures to match the present investment level before expand-
ing their investment scales.
4.4. Robustness checks
4.4.1. Alternative explanation of abundant investment opportunities
In addition to the political intervention of local governments and political promotion tournaments (Zhou,
2004), overinvestment in local SOEs may also be driven by abundant investment opportunities or other factors
unrelated to such intervention or promotion. To rule out this alternative explanation, we rerun the above
Table 11
Diﬀerences in the Eﬀects of Actual and Normal Investment Levels on Corporate Taxes Paid (Model (4.1)).
The Whole Sample Overinvestment Subsample Underinvestment Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable Tax_total Tax_turnover Tax_income Tax_total Tax_turnover Tax_income Tax_total Tax_turnover Tax_income
_cons 6.8820⁎⁎⁎ 8.4032⁎⁎⁎ 6.9658⁎⁎⁎ 6.7846⁎⁎⁎ 8.0523⁎⁎⁎ 7.3977⁎⁎⁎ 7.0492⁎⁎⁎ 8.6716⁎⁎⁎ 6.7707⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Invact 1.0399
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6228⁎⁎⁎ 1.2301⁎⁎⁎ 1.0800⁎⁎⁎ 0.6636⁎⁎⁎ 1.3212⁎⁎⁎ 1.0111⁎⁎⁎ 0.6073⁎⁎⁎ 1.1734⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Invnor 0.9475
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6406 2.1731⁎⁎⁎ 0.3464 0.7975 1.1618 1.1572⁎⁎⁎ 0.6047 2.6430⁎⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.119) (0.000) (0.550) (0.239) (0.143) (0.009) (0.242) (0.000)
Size 1.0273⁎⁎⁎ 1.0343⁎⁎⁎ 0.9973⁎⁎⁎ 1.0182⁎⁎⁎ 1.0200⁎⁎⁎ 1.0186⁎⁎⁎ 1.0368⁎⁎⁎ 1.0457⁎⁎⁎ 0.9875⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Roa 5.2680⁎⁎⁎ 3.0863⁎⁎⁎ 8.0375⁎⁎⁎ 5.5818⁎⁎⁎ 3.1417⁎⁎⁎ 8.4548⁎⁎⁎ 4.9908⁎⁎⁎ 3.0021⁎⁎⁎ 7.7049⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lev 0.2300⁎⁎⁎ 0.1765⁎⁎ 0.4723⁎⁎⁎ 0.0757 0.4780⁎⁎⁎ 0.2155 0.3960⁎⁎⁎ 0.0234 0.6062⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.470) (0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.799) (0.000)
CapInt 0.1133 0.5703⁎⁎⁎ 0.2411⁎⁎ 0.3225⁎⁎ 0.5686⁎⁎⁎ 0.1422 0.0305 0.5535⁎⁎⁎ 0.4015⁎⁎⁎
(0.128) (0.000) (0.020) (0.015) (0.000) (0.435) (0.738) (0.000) (0.002)
InvInt 1.6678⁎⁎⁎ 2.2889⁎⁎⁎ 1.2053⁎⁎⁎ 1.4639⁎⁎⁎ 2.0239⁎⁎⁎ 1.2081⁎⁎⁎ 1.7620⁎⁎⁎ 2.3918⁎⁎⁎ 1.2259⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IntInt 0.3024 0.7017⁎⁎⁎ 1.2248⁎⁎⁎ 0.0741 0.9686⁎⁎ 0.1442 0.4791⁎ 0.5487⁎ 1.6874⁎⁎⁎
(0.149) (0.004) (0.000) (0.847) (0.031) (0.788) (0.056) (0.061) (0.000)
MB 0.1265⁎⁎⁎ 0.0627⁎⁎⁎ 0.1553⁎⁎⁎ 0.0858⁎⁎⁎ 0.0011 0.1315⁎⁎⁎ 0.1530⁎⁎⁎ 0.1058⁎⁎⁎ 0.1744⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.971) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 8599 8571 8258 2935 2920 2824 5664 5651 5434
adj. R2 0.623 0.560 0.501 0.611 0.555 0.490 0.631 0.563 0.508
F 0.06 8.74⁎⁎⁎ 3.51⁎ 1.46 4.24⁎⁎ 0.04 0.10 5.08⁎⁎ 5.36⁎⁎
porb > F 0.8007 0.0031 0.0612 0.2266 0.0395 0.8477 0.7506 0.0242 0.0206
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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empirical tests using the central SOEs subsample and present the results in Table A2 in the Appendix. The
results show that almost every coeﬃcient of Distress1, Distress2, Distress1  N_Tax, and Distress2  N_Tax
is not statistically signiﬁcant, in either the overinvestment or the underinvestment subsamples, which is deﬁ-
nitely diﬀerent from the results gained from the local SOEs subsample.
Central SOEs are confronted with the same investment opportunities experienced by local SOEs operating
within the same province, but the former are almost free of local governmental intervention. Therefore, the
results in Table A2 rule out the possibility that the overinvestment of local SOEs is driven by abundant invest-
ment opportunities or other factors unrelated to government intervention or political promotion tournaments,
indirectly enhancing support for the perspective that local governments have an incentive to boost tax revenue
by forcing local SOEs to raise their investment scales and to exert greater pressure on ﬁrms that contribute less
to local ﬁscal revenue.
4.4.2. The probability of reverse causality between dependent and independent variables
Based on the grabbing hand theory, we assert that local governments have an incentive to boost tax revenue
by forcing the local SOEs under their control to raise their investment scales and to exert greater pressure on
ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁscal revenue. Our assertions are supported by the aforementioned empirical
results. We also determine from the empirical ﬁndings in the Further Analysis section (Section 4.3) that a lar-
ger investment scale could help to increase ﬁscal revenue by increasing both the income and turnover taxes
paid by the ﬁrm, which eﬀectively rules out the potential reverse causality of the overinvestment of local SOEs
leading to local ﬁscal distress. Finally, we perform Hausman tests on the dependent and two independent vari-
ables and get v2 values of 0.00 and 0.05, respectively, and a p-value of 1.0000 for each, suggesting that only
OLS is theoretically needed in this paper. However, in the interests of robustness, we perform 2SLS robustness
checks of the aforementioned empirical tests.
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t1 þ b2Sizei;t þ b3Roai;t þ b4Fcfi;t
þb5Duali;t þ b6Exeowni;t þ b7Herfi;t þ b8Dividi;t þ b9Debti;t þ b10Salaryi;t
þb11GDPgtht þ b12GovIntvnt þ
P
Industry þP Year þ e ð6:1Þ
Distressi;t ¼ c0 þ c1GovIntvnt þ c2GDP t þ c3Earthquaket þ
P
Year þ e ð6:2Þ
8>><
>>:
ð6Þ
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t1 þ b2Distressi;t1 N Taxi;t1
þb3N Taxi;t1 þ b4Sizei;t þ b5Roai;t þ b6Fcfi;t þ b7Duali;t þ b8Exeowni;t þ b9Herfi;tþb10Dividi;t
þb11Debti;t þ b12Salaryi;t þ b13GDPgtht þ b14GovIntvnt þ
P
Industry þP Year þ e ð7:1Þ
Distressi;t ¼ c0 þ c1GovIntvnt þ c2GDPt þ c3Earthquaket þ
P
Year þ e ð7:2Þ
8>><
>>:
ð7Þ
Models (6) and (7) are the 2SLS models. Models (6.1) and (7.1) are the same as Models (2) and (3) in
Section 3, respectively, and the instrument variables (IVs) in Models (6.2) and (7.2) are three provincial-level
variables: the index of reducing government intervention to enterprises in the Fan Gang marketization index,
the logarithm of the local GDP, and the number of earthquakes in the current year. We chose these three
variables as IVs because the local governments with ﬁscal distress are likely to be those with poor governance
and severe intervention into enterprises; because local governmental ﬁnance is generally highly correlated with
local GDP, as the better developed regions usually have suﬃcient ﬁscal revenue, with low probability of being
immersed in ﬁscal distress, and because earthquakes are strongly destructive, infrequent, and unpredictable
natural disasters that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence local ﬁnance. We perform a Pearson correlation analysis on the
proxies of local ﬁscal distress and the IVs and present the results in Table 12.
As Table 12 reveals, the two proxies of local ﬁscal distress and the three IVs are all signiﬁcantly correlated
at the 0.01 level, which satisﬁes the basic assumptions for IVs. The results of 2SLS for local SOEs are pre-
sented in Table 13.
Table 13 shows that except for Distress1t1  N_Taxt1, the results of 2SLS for local SOEs do not diﬀer
greatly from those using OLS (Tables 8–10), suggesting the robustness of the results. Moreover, the 2SLS
results rule out the potential reverse causality of the dependent and independent variables, supporting the
grabbing hand theory. Due to length constraints, the 2SLS results for non-SOEs and central SOEs are
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Table 12
Correlations of proxies for local ﬁscal distress and the IVs.
Distress1 Distress2 GovIntvn GDP Earthquake
Distress1 1.0000
Distress2 0.986⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000)
GovIntvn 0.735⁎⁎⁎ 0.726⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
GDP 0.563⁎⁎⁎ 0.604⁎⁎⁎ 0.545⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Earthquake 0.327⁎⁎⁎ 0.343⁎⁎⁎ 0.211⁎⁎⁎ 0.185⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p-Values in parentheses, p < 0.1, p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 13
Results of 2SLS for local SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
Main Results
_cons 0.8392⁎⁎⁎ 1.0052 0.8264⁎⁎⁎ 1.8494⁎⁎⁎ 0.1989⁎⁎⁎ 0.2290 0.2011⁎⁎⁎ 0.2645⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.348) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.278) (0.000) (0.000)
Distress1t1 0.0017
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0050 0.0002⁎ 0.0011
(0.009) (0.844) (0.061) (0.843)
Distress1t1  N_Taxt1 0.0004 0.0001
(0.804) (0.866)
Distress2t1 0.0020
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0169⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002⁎⁎ 0.0020⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.004) (0.014) (0.017)
Distress2t1  N_Taxt1 0.0009⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.033)
N_Taxt1 0.1111
⁎ 0.0633⁎⁎⁎ 0.0022 0.0040⁎
(0.060) (0.000) (0.856) (0.082)
Sizet 0.0514
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1349⁎⁎⁎ 0.0506⁎⁎⁎ 0.1331⁎⁎⁎ 0.0028⁎ 0.0025 0.0028⁎ 0.0024
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.275) (0.094) (0.271)
Roat 0.3556
⁎ 0.8667⁎⁎⁎ 0.3589⁎ 0.9300⁎⁎⁎ 0.0479⁎⁎ 0.0488⁎⁎ 0.0476⁎⁎ 0.0494⁎⁎
(0.099) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013)
Fcft 0.1758
⁎⁎ 0.2204⁎⁎⁎ 0.1776⁎⁎ 0.2298⁎⁎⁎ 0.1323⁎⁎⁎ 0.1323⁎⁎⁎ 0.1322⁎⁎⁎ 0.1325⁎⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0058 0.0141 0.0064 0.0132 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0017
(0.841) (0.612) (0.824) (0.628) (0.627) (0.667) (0.640) (0.679)
Exeownt 0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
(0.959) (0.988) (0.945) (0.995) (0.187) (0.183) (0.190) (0.185)
Herft 0.0041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0039⁎⁎⁎ 0.0041⁎⁎⁎ 0.0038⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.930) (0.966) (0.895) (0.953)
Dividt 0.1245⁎⁎ 0.0555 0.1246⁎⁎ 0.0519 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010
(0.040) (0.345) (0.040) (0.368) (0.914) (0.918) (0.907) (0.907)
Debtt 0.3633
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2901⁎⁎⁎ 0.3694⁎⁎⁎ 0.3042⁎⁎⁎ 0.0410⁎⁎⁎ 0.0401⁎⁎ 0.0406⁎⁎⁎ 0.0394⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Salaryt 0.0423⁎⁎⁎ 0.0291⁎⁎ 0.0428⁎⁎⁎ 0.0268⁎⁎ 0.0051⁎⁎ 0.0051⁎⁎ 0.0052⁎⁎ 0.0053⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.042) (0.003) (0.049) (0.017) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011)
GDPgtht 0.0040 0.0052
⁎ 0.0042 0.0059⁎⁎ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.190) (0.082) (0.171) (0.041) (0.797) (0.877) (0.812) (0.917)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1134 1134 1134 1134 2190 2190 2190 2190
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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provided in Tables A3 and A4, which are also nonsigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from those using OLS (Tables 8–10
and A2).
4.4.3. The alternative approach of tax enforcement
Our H2 argues that governments generate their ﬁscal revenue through taxes and that the incentive to
extract from enterprises is stronger in the ﬁrms that make fewer contributions to local ﬁnance, following
the grabbing hand theory, such that lower taxes paid by local SOEs enhances the positive relationship
described by H1 between local ﬁscal distress and the overinvestment of local SOEs. However, in addition
to the investment approach, local governments could achieve their ﬁnance goal by enhancing their tax enforce-
ment or directly consulting with the enterprises under control. Theoretically, ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes are
probably more aggressive when it comes to tax avoidance, so enhancing the tax enforcement of aggressive
tax-avoiding ﬁrms may be a more eﬀective way to generate local ﬁscal revenue than extracting from local
SOEs.
Two frequently used proxies for the aggressiveness of tax avoidance are the Book-Tax diﬀerence (BTD)
(Mills, 1998; Desai, 2003; Wilson, 2009) and the Eﬀective Tax Rate (ETR) (Zimmerman, 1983; Gupta and
Newberry, 1997; Wilson, 2009). However, tax preferences in China vary, which makes the measurement com-
plex. Some tax preferences in China are linked to the tax basis, by reducing or exempting taxes on ﬁrms’ oper-
ating results. For example, R&D expenditures could be additionally deducted or amortized at the 50% level,6
and the production of high-tech enterprises is exempt from income taxes in the initial 2 years and must only
pay half in the initial 8 years.7 Other tax preferences are based on tax rates, such as the income tax rate for
transitional ﬁrms in special zones and the high-tech enterprise certiﬁcate applicable tax rate.8 The amount
of tax reduction due to tax preferences cannot be totally viewed as the result of tax avoidance because for
ﬁrms, the desire for self-development is more intense than that for tax avoidance, so most tax preferences
are the side beneﬁts of business strategies. For example, the main purpose of R&D activities should be inno-
vation demands to increase ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, not for the tax savings from the additional 50% deduction or
amortization. Moreover, some earnings management activities based on these accounting standards also serve
the goal of tax deduction (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).
Based on the above analysis, we construct Model (8), in which the residual (ei,t) represents the aggressive-
ness of corporate tax avoidance, following Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009). BTD in Model (8) represents
the Book-Tax diﬀerence scaled by the 1-year lagged value of ﬁrm size. TA represents total accruals, including
the change in (1) Current Assets, (2) Current Liabilities, (3) Cash and Short-Term Investments, and (4) the Level
in Depreciation and Amortization, scaled by the 1-year lagged value of ﬁrm size following Desai and Dharma-
pala (2009). li,t represents ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, we incorporate the level of R&D Expenditure, also
scaled by the 1-year lagged value of ﬁrm size, based on China’s institutional environment. Finally, the residual
ei,t is deﬁned as the portion of the Book-Tax diﬀerence that could not be explained by corporate earnings man-
agement or R&D activities, namely the aggressiveness of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009),
represented by BTD1 (see Table 14).
In considering robustness, we also measure the level of earnings management with the Jones model of dis-
cretionary accruals, denoting BTD11, BTD12, BTD21, and BTD22 as the discretionary accruals with operat-
ing proﬁt under the Jones model, net proﬁt under the Jones model, operating proﬁt under the modiﬁed Jones
model, and net proﬁt under the modiﬁed Jones model, respectively. Panel A in Table 14 shows the Pearson
correlation matrix of corporate taxes paid and tax avoidance aggressiveness for the sample between 2002
and 2010, in which Tax_total is calculated by the logarithm of corporate total taxes paid, including both
income and turnover taxes, and Tax_income is calculated by the logarithm of income taxes.
Public ﬁrms in China did not disclose detailed nominal tax rate and tax preferences in the footnotes to
ﬁnancial statements of their annual reports until 2007, so we calculate the level of corporate tax avoidance
in the 2007–2010 subsample in Model (9), in which Tax_base is a dummy variable representing the tax pref-
erences linked to the tax basis, that takes the value one if there is an exemption or reduction in income taxes
6 See details in The tax law of the People’s Republic of China and Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.
7 See details in The tax law of the People’s Republic of China and Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.
8 See details in The tax law of the People’s Republic of China and Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.
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mentioned in the footnotes to ﬁnancial statements, and zero otherwise. The other variables are identical to
those in Model (8), and the Pearson correlation matrix of corporate tax paid and tax avoidance aggressiveness
is presented in Panel B of Table 14.
BTDi;t ¼ b0 þ b1TAi;t þ b2R&Di;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð8Þ
BTDi;t ¼ b0 þ b1TAi;t þ b2R&Di;t þ b3Tax basei;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð9Þ
ETRi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Speczonei;t þ b2Highteci;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð10Þ
ETRi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Speczonei;t þ b2Tax ratei;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð11Þ
Models (10) and (11) use the eﬀective tax rate (ETR) to measure the level of tax avoidance. The theory is
basically the same as that for Models (8) and (9), with ETR represented by the item Eﬀective Tax Rate dis-
closed in the operating capacity ﬁle of ﬁnancial reports. Speczone is a dummy variable representing special
economic zones in China, equal to one if the corporation operates in the ﬁve special zones of Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan, and zero otherwise. Hightec is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the ﬁrm is a high-tech ﬁrm or if it applies a transitional income tax rate of 25%, and such is stated in the
footnotes to ﬁnancial statements, and zero otherwise. For the same reasons given for the models using
BTD, we apply the 2002–2010 and 2007–2010 samples to Models (10) and (11), respectively, with the residuals
ei,t representing the level of corporate tax avoidance, denoted by ETR1 and ETR2, respectively. The Pearson
Table 14
Pearson correlations of corporate taxes paid with BTD and ETR.
Variable Tax_total Tax_income BTD BTD1 BTD11 BTD12 BTD21 BTD22
Panel A
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.8842⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD 0.0379⁎⁎⁎ 0.0561⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD1 0.0277⁎ 0.0486⁎⁎⁎ 0.8574⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD11 0.0517⁎⁎⁎ 0.0726⁎⁎⁎ 0.9891⁎⁎⁎ 0.8384⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD12 0.0198 0.0606⁎⁎⁎ 0.7071⁎⁎⁎ 0.6399⁎⁎⁎ 0.7364⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD21 0.0517⁎⁎⁎ 0.0707⁎⁎⁎ 0.9822⁎⁎⁎ 0.8347⁎⁎⁎ 0.9946⁎⁎⁎ 0.7220⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD22 0.0179 0.0574⁎⁎⁎ 0.6975⁎⁎⁎ 0.6327⁎⁎⁎ 0.7274⁎⁎⁎ 0.9895⁎⁎⁎ 0.7232⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
Panel B
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.9003⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD 0.0589⁎⁎⁎ 0.0692⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD1 0.0346⁎⁎ 0.0458⁎⁎⁎ 0.8549⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD11 0.0581⁎⁎⁎ 0.0704⁎⁎⁎ 0.9881⁎⁎⁎ 0.8351⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD12 0.0283⁎ 0.0578⁎⁎⁎ 0.7004⁎⁎⁎ 0.6302⁎⁎⁎ 0.7300⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD21 0.0580⁎⁎⁎ 0.0685⁎⁎⁎ 0.9812⁎⁎⁎ 0.8313⁎⁎⁎ 0.9945⁎⁎⁎ 0.7151⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD22 0.0263⁎ 0.0541⁎⁎⁎ 0.6904⁎⁎⁎ 0.6226⁎⁎⁎ 0.7206⁎⁎⁎ 0.9889⁎⁎⁎ 0.7162⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
Variable Tax_total Tax_income ETR ETR1
Panel C
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.8842⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
ETR 0.0080 0.0113 1.0000
ETR1 0.0106 0.0136 0.9993⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
Panel D
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.9003⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
ETR 0.0015 0.0030 1.0000
ETR2 0.0026 0.0040 0.9939⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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correlation matrices of corporate tax paid and tax avoidance aggressiveness are presented in Panels C and D
of Table 14, respectively.
As Panels A and B of Table 14 show, the BTD modiﬁed by earnings management and tax preferences
(BTD1 and BTD11–BTD22) or the unmodiﬁed BTD (BTD) is positively related or unrelated to corporate
total taxes or income taxes paid, indicating no statistical evidence supporting the point of view that ﬁrms that
pay fewer taxes exhibit more aggressive tax avoidance.
In Panels C and D, neither the ETR modiﬁed by tax preferences (ETR1 and ETR2) nor the unmodiﬁed
ETR (ETR) are correlated with corporate total taxes or income taxes paid, indicating no statistical evidence
supporting the point of view that ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes exhibit more aggressive tax avoidance.
The results from Panels A–D provide no evidence to support the point of view that ﬁrms that pay fewer
taxes exhibit more aggressive tax avoidance, furthering the assertion that governments increase tax revenue
by enhancing their tax enforcement on the ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes, which indirectly supports H2.
4.4.4. The mediation of free cash ﬂow
Jensen (1986) argues that high free cash ﬂow triggers agency problems that result in overinvestment, but
this problem could be mitigated by raising debt, which reduces ﬁrms’ free cash ﬂow – an argument supported
by Tang et al. (2007). Wei and Liu (2007) and Tang et al. (2007) indirectly determine the positive relationship
between corporate free cash ﬂow and overinvestment by examining how cash dividends restrain the level of
overinvestment. Therefore, to rule out the potential explanation that ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes are generally
faced with the problem of overinvestment in response to their high free cash ﬂow preserved in the ﬁrm due to
tax saving activities, we scale total taxes paid (the sum of Income Tax Expense and Business Tax and Sur-
charges on the income statement) with total assets, denote corporate tax intensity and rerun the empirical tests
in Table 9 with corporate tax intensity, represented by N_TaxI, instead of corporate taxes paid. The results
presented in Table A5 show that none of the coeﬃcients for the interaction terms of Distress1  N_TaxI
and Distress2  N_TaxI and for N_TaxI are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that corporate tax intensity
has no eﬀect on ﬁrms’ overinvestment. Combined with the results in Table 9, our ﬁndings suggest that the
positive eﬀect that low corporate taxes paid has on the relationship between local ﬁscal distress and corporate
overinvestment is triggered by the political intervention of local governments, thus ruling out the possibility of
a mediating eﬀect through free cash ﬂow.
4.4.5. An alternative explanation for H2 – the helping hand theory
We have a potential competing theory for H2 – the helping hand theory. Local governments and local
SOEs have innumerable links through funds and personnel issues, and local governments always have a ten-
dency to protect and support the local SOEs under their control, which is generally called paternalism (Hu,
2001). Local governments may oﬀer a helping hand by serving as an invisible underwriter to help local SOEs
lessen ﬁnancing constraints when applying for bank loans (Zhu and Li, 2008) or by seeking investment pro-
jects for local SOEs to help them out of dilemmas prompted by operational or ﬁnancial problems, which
results in overinvestment by local SOEs. The ﬁrms with low operating and ﬁnancial performance generally
have low proﬁtability, with both low turnover taxes based on corporate operations and low income taxes
based on proﬁts, indicating their limited contribution to local ﬁnance.
While such governmental helping hands can decrease ﬁnancing constraints in the loan application process
or discover investment projects for local SOEs, the latter (discovering investment projects for local SOEs) is
diﬃcult to observe. However, both activities should exist simultaneously in capital markets and satisfy a cer-
tain distribution that will allow us to deduce the existence or even the intensity of governmental helping hands
by observing the activities of the former (decreasing ﬁnancing constraints in local SOEs’ loan application pro-
cess). Given the ubiquitous soft budget constraints of local SOEs, banks’ requirements for accounting conser-
vatism on SOEs are much lower than those for non-SOEs, which is clearly a reﬂection of the government’s
helping hand. Another type of soft budget constraint is for governments to serve as invisible underwriters
by helping SOEs to lessen their ﬁnancing constraints when applying for bank loans. Consequently, following
Basu (1997), we construct a model of accounting conservatism to help rule out the competitive explanation of
paternalism by investigating the eﬀect of 1-year lagged values of corporate taxes paid on banks’ requirements
for accounting conservatism.
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Model (12) is the model constructed by Basu (1997), with EPSit as a ﬁrm’s earnings per share in year t, Pit1
as the stock closing price in year t  1, Retit as the annual stock returns in year t and Drit as a dummy variable,
that takes the value of one if Retit < 0, and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcient of Retit  Drit, b3, determines the
extent of accounting conservatism.
EPSit=P it1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Retit  Drit þ e ð12Þ
Models (13)–(15) measure the eﬀects of the interactions of other variables with corporate accounting con-
servatism by incorporating interaction terms into Basu’s (1997) basic model. Model (13) adds the interactions
of corporate liability levels Nt and other variables in year t on the basis of Model (12), representing the total
debt-to-asset ratio Lev, the ratio of long-term debt on total assets Ldebt and the ratio of short-term debt on
total assets Sdebt, respectively. Hence, the coeﬃcient of Rett  Drt  Nt, b7 represents the eﬀect of corporate
capital structure on accounting conservatism.
Table 15
Corporate tax payment, capital structure and accounting conservatism for local SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Levt Ldebtt Sdebtt
_cons 0.0351⁎⁎⁎ 0.0616⁎⁎⁎ 0.0371⁎⁎⁎ 0.0518⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drt 0.0072 0.0098 0.0058 0.0052
(0.113) (0.391) (0.303) (0.437)
Rett 0.0183
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0053 0.0159⁎⁎⁎ 0.0158⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.000)
Lowt1 0.0351⁎⁎⁎ 0.0273⁎⁎⁎ 0.0331⁎⁎⁎ 0.0257⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rett  Drt 0.0235⁎⁎ 0.0312 0.0291⁎⁎ 0.0231
(0.021) (0.284) (0.028) (0.135)
Rett  Lowt1 0.0144⁎⁎⁎ 0.0004 0.0095⁎⁎⁎ 0.0141⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.926) (0.000) (0.000)
Drt  Lowt1 0.0005 0.0163 0.0021 0.0045
(0.927) (0.159) (0.761) (0.570)
Rett  Drt  Lowt1 0.0301⁎⁎ 0.0308 0.0094 0.0066
(0.043) (0.337) (0.603) (0.751)
Nt 0.0422⁎⁎⁎ 0.0113 0.0864⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.693) (0.000)
Rett  Nt 0.0199⁎⁎ 0.0137 0.0059
(0.014) (0.497) (0.694)
Drt  Nt 0.0172 0.0246 0.0439
(0.449) (0.635) (0.254)
Rett  Drt  Nt 0.0169 0.0532 0.0246
(0.753) (0.632) (0.774)
Nt  Lowt1 0.0438⁎⁎⁎ 0.1766⁎⁎⁎ 0.0944⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rett  Nt  Lowt1 0.0087 0.0085 0.0422⁎⁎
(0.318) (0.754) (0.021)
Drt  Nt  Lowt1 0.0649⁎⁎⁎ 0.1867⁎⁎⁎ 0.0966⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.007) (0.021)
Rett  Drt  Nt  Lowt1 0.0887 0.2546⁎ 0.1149
(0.111) (0.088) (0.230)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 5142 5142 5118 5142
Adj. R-sq 0.131 0.184 0.139 0.185
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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EPSit=P it1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Nit þ b4Retit  Drit þ b5Rett  Nt þ b6Drt  Nt þ b7Rett
 Drt  Nt þ e ð13Þ
Model (14) adds the interactions of a low level of corporate taxes paid and other variables to Model (12), in
which Lowt1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the taxes paid by the ﬁrm in year t  1 are
lower than the median value of the total SOE subsample in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. Thus,
the coeﬃcient of Rett  Drt  Lowt1, b7 represents the eﬀect of low corporate taxes paid on accounting
conservatism.
EPSit=P it1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Lowit1 þ b4Retit  Drit þ b5Rett  Lowt1 þ b6Drt  Lowt1
þ b7Rett  Drt  Lowt1 þ e ð14Þ
EPSit=P it1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Lowit1 þ b4Retit  Drit þ b5Rett  Lowt1 þ b6Drt  Lowt1
þ b7Rett  Drt  Lowt1 þ b8Nt þ b9Rett  Nt þ b10Drt  Nt þ b11Rett  Drt  Nt
þ b12Nt  Lowt1 þ b13Rett  Nt  Lowt1 þ b14Drt  Nt  Lowt1 þ b15Rett  Drt
 Nt  Lowt1 þ e ð15Þ
Table A1
Diﬀerences in the eﬀects of actual and normal investment levels on corporate performance (Model (5.1)).
The whole sample Overinvestment subsample Underinvestment subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Roa Opr Roa Opr Roa Opr
_cons 0.0826⁎⁎⁎ 0.3796⁎⁎⁎ 0.0850⁎⁎ 0.4046⁎⁎⁎ 0.1075⁎⁎⁎ 0.4232⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Invact 0.0299
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1386⁎⁎⁎ 0.0422⁎⁎⁎ 0.1857⁎⁎⁎ 0.0224⁎⁎⁎ 0.1085⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Invnor 0.2854
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7469⁎⁎⁎ 0.2572⁎⁎⁎ 0.5619⁎⁎⁎ 0.2840⁎⁎⁎ 0.8039⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L_Size 0.0035⁎⁎⁎ 0.0219⁎⁎⁎ 0.0040⁎⁎ 0.0270⁎⁎⁎ 0.0047⁎⁎⁎ 0.0225⁎⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
L_Lev 0.0642⁎⁎⁎ 0.3734⁎⁎⁎ 0.0488⁎⁎⁎ 0.3449⁎⁎⁎ 0.0729⁎⁎⁎ 0.3912⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Herf 0.0003⁎⁎⁎ 0.0008⁎⁎⁎ 0.0003⁎⁎⁎ 0.0007⁎⁎ 0.0004⁎⁎⁎ 0.0009⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000)
Dual 0.0028 0.0192⁎⁎ 0.0061⁎ 0.0276⁎⁎ -0.0008 0.0139
(0.205) (0.013) (0.084) (0.033) (0.780) (0.149)
Growth 0.0231⁎⁎⁎ 0.0704⁎⁎⁎ 0.0172⁎⁎⁎ 0.0508⁎⁎⁎ 0.0264⁎⁎⁎ 0.0820⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fcf 0.0600⁎⁎⁎ 0.1006⁎⁎⁎ 0.0358⁎⁎⁎ 0.0139 0.0772⁎⁎⁎ 0.1819⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.654) (0.000) (0.000)
CapInt 0.0496⁎⁎⁎ 0.1183⁎⁎⁎ 0.0440⁎⁎⁎ 0.0993⁎⁎⁎ 0.0493⁎⁎⁎ 0.1218⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
MB 0.0131⁎⁎⁎ 0.0036 0.0142⁎⁎⁎ 0.0003 0.0118⁎⁎⁎ 0.0084⁎
(0.000) (0.344) (0.000) (0.964) (0.000) (0.097)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 7082 7082 2475 2475 4607 4607
adj. R2 0.200 0.225 0.168 0.187 0.216 0.250
F 89.74⁎⁎⁎ 40.44⁎⁎⁎ 23.42⁎⁎⁎ 5.27⁎⁎ 58.56⁎⁎⁎ 34.21⁎⁎⁎
porb > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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Model (15) adds the interactions of Lowt1 and other variables to Model (13), so the coeﬃcient of
Rett  Drt  Nt  Lowt1, b15 represents the eﬀect of low corporate taxes paid on the relationship between
corporate capital structure and accounting conservatism.
The results for the eﬀect of low corporate taxes paid on the relationship between corporate capital structure
and accounting conservatism are presented in Table 15 and reveal that the coeﬃcient of Rett  Drt  Lowt1
in column (1) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that banks raise their requirements for account-
ing conservatism on those local SOEs with low operating and ﬁnancial performance. Nt in columns (2), (3) and
(4), respectively, represents Levt, Ldebtt and Sdebtt, in which the coeﬃcients of Rett  Drt  Nt  Lowt1 in
columns (2) and (4) are positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant while that in column (3) is signiﬁcantly positive,
indicating that the low taxes paid by local SOEs have no eﬀect on the relationship between total liabilities and
short-term debt and accounting conservatism. They do, however, raise banks’ requirements for the accounting
Table A2
Local ﬁscal distress, corporate overinvestment and the eﬀect of corporate taxes paid for central SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
_cons 0.4295 0.4032 0.3387 0.2143 0.1327⁎⁎ 0.1322⁎⁎ 0.1266⁎ 0.1265⁎
(0.372) (0.399) (0.519) (0.735) (0.032) (0.034) (0.076) (0.083)
Distress1t1 0.0013⁎ 0.0082 0.0001 0.0015⁎
(0.085) (0.115) (0.366) (0.063)
Distress1t1  N_Taxt1 0.0004 0.0001⁎
(0.240) (0.086)
Distress2t1 0.0014 0.0057 0.0001 0.0015⁎
(0.108) (0.479) (0.365) (0.098)
Distress2t1  N_Taxt1 0.0002 0.0001
(0.626) (0.133)
N_Taxt1 0.0494
⁎⁎ 0.0415⁎ 0.0074⁎⁎⁎ 0.0072⁎⁎⁎
(0.026) (0.083) (0.007) (0.008)
Sizet 0.0090 0.0090 0.0430
⁎⁎ 0.0410⁎⁎ 0.0005 0.0005 0.0051 0.0050
(0.553) (0.554) (0.021) (0.024) (0.854) (0.859) (0.142) (0.155)
Roat 0.1832 0.1806 0.3134 0.3016 0.1209⁎⁎ 0.1209⁎⁎ 0.1320⁎⁎ 0.1320⁎⁎
(0.384) (0.388) (0.120) (0.132) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Fcft 0.1335 0.1329 0.1586
⁎⁎ 0.1586⁎⁎ 0.1628⁎⁎⁎ 0.1629⁎⁎⁎ 0.1677⁎⁎⁎ 0.1674⁎⁎⁎
(0.105) (0.109) (0.037) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0034 0.0035 0.0006 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0013 0.0013
(0.923) (0.920) (0.987) (0.981) (0.824) (0.836) (0.787) (0.783)
Exeownt 0.0017 0.0017 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019 0.0021 0.0021
(0.357) (0.351) (0.155) (0.208) (0.376) (0.383) (0.310) (0.318)
Herft 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.903) (0.862) (0.988) (0.975) (0.883) (0.888) (0.952) (0.964)
Dividt 0.1716 0.1700 0.1774 0.1732 0.0006 0.0007 0.0024 0.0024
(0.149) (0.150) (0.135) (0.144) (0.943) (0.942) (0.787) (0.791)
Debtt 0.1765
⁎ 0.1728⁎ 0.1520 0.1579 0.0477⁎⁎ 0.0475⁎⁎ 0.0544⁎⁎⁎ 0.0541⁎⁎⁎
(0.080) (0.083) (0.129) (0.119) (0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009)
Salaryt 0.0412⁎ 0.0400⁎ 0.0347 0.0323 0.0062⁎⁎ 0.0062⁎⁎ 0.0069⁎⁎ 0.0069⁎⁎
(0.067) (0.079) (0.196) (0.236) (0.046) (0.043) (0.027) (0.024)
GDPgtht 0.0039
⁎ 0.0035 0.0026 0.0024 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
(0.091) (0.114) (0.300) (0.312) (0.447) (0.432) (0.440) (0.437)
GovIntvnt 0.0162⁎ 0.0151⁎ 0.0176⁎ 0.0164⁎ 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006
(0.066) (0.058) (0.063) (0.051) (0.687) (0.699) (0.605) (0.617)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 505 505 505 505 973 973 973 973
adj. R2 0.074 0.072 0.086 0.083 0.173 0.173 0.176 0.175
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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conservatism of local SOEs on long-term debt. In summary, the results suggest that there is no evidence that
banks lessen their requirements for accounting conservatism on local SOEs with low operating and ﬁnancial
performance. Local governments never oﬀer a helping hand on this issue, thus ruling out the possibility that
the paternalism of local governments politically intervenes in the investment activities of local SOEs, resulting
in a greater extent of overinvestment for those SOEs with lower taxes paid.
4.4.6. Systematic errors of the overinvestment model
Given the systematic errors of the overinvestment model, there must be a diﬀerent predicted value from the
corresponding observed value, and not all gaps between these two values are necessarily overinvestment or
underinvestment, so we select the observations that are larger than the tenth percentile of OverInvi,t, and Und-
erInvi,t to be our research sample and obtain the above empirical results. To determine the robustness of our
sample selection procedure, we (1) expand the sample to include the whole sample with no percentile selection
Table A3
Results of 2SLS for non-SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
Main results
_cons 0.3516 0.6661 0.3417 0.7559⁎⁎⁎ 0.3816⁎⁎⁎ 0.4274⁎ 0.3817⁎⁎⁎ 0.3655⁎⁎⁎
(0.136) (0.411) (0.144) (0.006) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000)
Distress1t1 0.0007 0.0021 0.0000 0.0022
(0.127) (0.930) (0.963) (0.729)
Distress1t1  N_Taxt1 0.0002 0.0001
(0.910) (0.730)
Distress2t1 0.0008 0.0009 0.0000 0.0004
(0.124) (0.848) (0.904) (0.687)
Distress2t1  N_Taxt1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.950) (0.673)
N_Taxt1 0.0608 0.0541
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0090 0.0048⁎
(0.259) (0.000) (0.549) (0.071)
Sizet 0.0288
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0794⁎⁎⁎ 0.0287⁎⁎⁎ 0.0783⁎⁎⁎ 0.0125⁎⁎⁎ 0.0082⁎⁎ 0.0125⁎⁎⁎ 0.0088⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Roat 0.0788 0.1563 0.0768 0.1580 0.0108 0.0055 0.0108 0.0062
(0.592) (0.289) (0.602) (0.283) (0.473) (0.722) (0.471) (0.680)
Fcft 0.0727 0.0757 0.0734 0.0731 0.1347⁎⁎⁎ 0.1356⁎⁎⁎ 0.1347⁎⁎⁎ 0.1347⁎⁎⁎
(0.120) (0.149) (0.117) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0053 0.0068 0.0054 0.0062 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0007
(0.790) (0.736) (0.787) (0.749) (0.999) (0.797) (0.997) (0.850)
Exeownt 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎
(0.913) (0.965) (0.940) (0.985) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Herft 0.0027
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0026⁎⁎⁎ 0.0026⁎⁎⁎ 0.0025⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.312) (0.348) (0.311) (0.357)
Dividt 0.0812 0.1289
⁎⁎ 0.0803 0.1287⁎⁎ 0.0214⁎ 0.0250⁎⁎ 0.0215⁎ 0.0256⁎⁎
(0.152) (0.021) (0.157) (0.021) (0.082) (0.049) (0.081) (0.039)
Debtt 0.1352 0.1335 0.1388 0.1351 0.0443
⁎⁎ 0.0438⁎⁎ 0.0443⁎⁎ 0.0432⁎⁎
(0.143) (0.140) (0.131) (0.132) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027)
Salaryt 0.0289⁎⁎ 0.0144 0.0293⁎⁎ 0.0141 0.0038⁎ 0.0032 0.0038⁎ 0.0029
(0.017) (0.254) (0.014) (0.232) (0.082) (0.186) (0.079) (0.179)
GDPgtht 0.0051
⁎⁎ 0.0053⁎⁎ 0.0052⁎⁎ 0.0055⁎⁎ 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
(0.045) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.180) (0.156) (0.176) (0.125)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 977 977 977 977 1961 1961 1961 1961
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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and (2) shrink it to include only observations that are larger than the twenty-ﬁfth percentile of OverInvi,t, and
UnderInvi,t. We rerun the previous empirical tests with these two samples and ﬁnd that the results are consis-
tent with those in Tables 8–10, ruling out the possibility of bias induced by the sample selection procedure.
5. Conclusion
Our empirical tests and robustness checks support the following conclusions. The extent of local SOEs
overinvestment (underinvestment) is positively (negatively) related to the level of local ﬁscal distress, and
the positive (negative) relationship is enhanced when fewer taxes are paid by local SOEs. There is no evidence
that the investment behavior of non-SOEs or central SOEs is related to local ﬁnance or corporate taxes paid,
with the results for non-SOEs demonstrating the existence of political intervention and the results of central
SOEs ruling out the possibility of abundant investment opportunities. Increasing ﬁrms’ investment scales
Table A4
Results of 2SLS for central SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
Main results
_cons 0.2809 1.0418 0.2762 0.0819 0.1397⁎⁎ 0.2522 0.1364⁎⁎ 0.1322⁎⁎
(0.443) (0.640) (0.437) (0.859) (0.014) (0.192) (0.012) (0.049)
Distress1t1 0.0010 0.0269 0.0000 0.0023
(0.227) (0.639) (0.943) (0.680)
Distress1t1  N_Taxt1 0.0015 0.0001
(0.651) (0.681)
Distress2t1 0.0009 0.0029 0.0000 0.0013
(0.193) (0.708) (0.766) (0.247)
Distress2t1  N_Taxt1 0.0002 0.0001
(0.624) (0.260)
N_Taxt1 0.0369 0.0389⁎ 0.0014 0.0072⁎⁎
(0.805) (0.072) (0.918) (0.032)
Sizet 0.0085 0.0250 0.0090 0.0392
⁎⁎ 0.0005 0.0038 0.0005 0.0050⁎
(0.516) (0.470) (0.489) (0.023) (0.825) (0.298) (0.815) (0.096)
Roat 0.1966 0.2526 0.1986 0.3142 0.1212⁎⁎⁎ 0.1352⁎⁎⁎ 0.1209⁎⁎⁎ 0.1320⁎⁎⁎
(0.407) (0.422) (0.402) (0.189) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fcft 0.1260
⁎ 0.1534⁎ 0.1195⁎ 0.1424⁎⁎ 0.1628⁎⁎⁎ 0.1640⁎⁎⁎ 0.1627⁎⁎⁎ 0.1671⁎⁎⁎
(0.057) (0.058) (0.070) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0014 0.0036 0.0013 0.0043 0.0011 0.0020 0.0011 0.0014
(0.972) (0.941) (0.975) (0.915) (0.880) (0.788) (0.881) (0.845)
Exeownt 0.0024 0.0017 0.0024 0.0027 0.0019 0.0024 0.0019 0.0022
(0.702) (0.827) (0.698) (0.661) (0.709) (0.650) (0.708) (0.673)
Herft 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.863) (0.999) (0.817) (0.940) (0.881) (0.858) (0.872) (0.985)
Dividt 0.1660
⁎⁎ 0.1524⁎ 0.1684⁎⁎⁎ 0.1713⁎⁎⁎ 0.0008 0.0010 0.0007 0.0025
(0.010) (0.071) (0.009) (0.008) (0.948) (0.940) (0.951) (0.838)
Debtt 0.1878
⁎ 0.2500 0.1792 0.1657 0.0486⁎⁎ 0.0525⁎⁎ 0.0478⁎⁎ 0.0543⁎⁎
(0.098) (0.218) (0.110) (0.142) (0.043) (0.034) (0.045) (0.023)
Salaryt 0.0424⁎⁎ 0.0242 0.0428⁎⁎ 0.0358⁎⁎ 0.0062⁎ 0.0075⁎⁎ 0.0061⁎⁎ 0.0068⁎⁎
(0.022) (0.437) (0.016) (0.048) (0.054) (0.023) (0.044) (0.025)
GDPgtht 0.0044 0.0049 0.0046 0.0037 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
(0.206) (0.325) (0.172) (0.274) (0.236) (0.358) (0.238) (0.230)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 505 505 505 505 973 973 973 973
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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could help to increase the total taxes paid, including both income and turnover taxes, further resulting in
higher local ﬁscal revenue. Turnover taxes paid by ﬁrms are not aﬀected by corporate investment eﬃciency
and the income taxes paid by underinvested ﬁrms are much lower than those paid by their normal-level coun-
terparts. Local governments should increase their tax revenue by increasing the investment scales of underin-
vested ﬁrms to meet the normal levels and by helping overinvested ﬁrms to adjust their production, operation
and capital structures to match the present investment level before expanding their investment scale. The
empirical results suggest that local governments could achieve the goal of raising ﬁscal revenue by increasing
the investment scales of local SOEs, which directly results in an increase in total taxes paid. Hausman tests and
2SLS with IVs also exclude the possibility that the overinvestment of local SOEs leads to local ﬁscal distress.
There is no evidence supporting the assertion that local governments increase their tax revenue by enhancing
their tax enforcement on ﬁrms who pay fewer taxes, thus indirectly supporting the hypothesis that local gov-
ernments increase their tax revenue by forcing ﬁrms paying lower taxes to raise their investment scales. There
Table A5
Eﬀect of corporate tax intensity on local ﬁscal distress and corporate overinvestment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons 1.0098⁎⁎⁎ 1.0074⁎⁎⁎ 0.2926 0.2872
(0.001) (0.001) (0.129) (0.138)
Distress1t1 0.0022
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005
(0.006) (0.315)
Distress1t1  N_TaxIt1 0.0236 0.0011
(0.419) (0.952)
Distress2t1 0.0026
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005
(0.007) (0.393)
Distress2t1  N_TaxIt1 0.0324 0.0000
(0.366) (1.000)
N_Taxt1 0.0988 0.1679 0.4874 0.4491
(0.939) (0.909) (0.522) (0.599)
Sizet 0.0614
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0607⁎⁎⁎ 0.0249⁎⁎⁎ 0.0249⁎⁎⁎
0.000 0.000 (0.003) (0.003)
Roat 0.5622
⁎⁎ 0.5690⁎⁎ 0.0939 0.0925
(0.026) (0.025) (0.316) (0.323)
Fcft 0.2093
⁎⁎ 0.2109⁎⁎ 0.0566 0.0573
(0.014) (0.014) (0.157) (0.151)
Dualt 0.0048 0.0052 0.0100 0.0100
(0.882) (0.871) (0.563) (0.562)
Exeownt 0.0187 0.0186 0.0002 0.0001
(0.712) (0.715) (0.886) (0.899)
Herft 0.0046
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0046⁎⁎⁎ 0.0019⁎⁎⁎ 0.0018⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dividt 0.1182 0.1181 0.0599 0.0588
(0.102) (0.102) (0.262) (0.271)
Debtt 0.4231
⁎⁎⁎ 0.4285⁎⁎⁎ 0.1383⁎ 0.1409⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.091)
Salaryt 0.0502⁎⁎⁎ 0.0505⁎⁎⁎ 0.0226⁎⁎ 0.0230⁎⁎
(0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.022)
GDPgtht 0.0029 0.0031 0.0048
⁎⁎ 0.0049⁎⁎
(0.405) (0.373) (0.033) (0.030)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 1161 1161 1048 1048
adj. R2 0.130 0.129 0.052 0.051
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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is no evidence that the tax intensity of local SOEs or non-SOEs inﬂuences the relationship between corporate
overinvestment and local ﬁnance, thus ruling out the possibility that overinvestment induced by a diﬀerence in
the amount of tax payment is mediated by changes in free cash ﬂow. There is no evidence that governmental
helping hands play a role in helping SOEs with low operating and ﬁnance performance, thus ruling out the
possibility that local governments oﬀer a helping hand by serving as an invisible underwriter to help local
SOEs lessen ﬁnancing constraints when applying for bank loans or by seeking investment projects for local
SOEs. This also indirectly veriﬁes that the intensifying eﬀect of the lower contribution made by local SOEs
to the positive relationship between local ﬁscal distress and the overinvestment of local SOEs is due to the
political intervention of a local governmental grabbing hand.
Above all, we conclude that local governments have an incentive to increase ﬁscal revenue when faced with
ﬁnancial distress, by forcing the local SOEs under their control to raise their investment scales, resulting in
either overinvestment or lowering the level of underinvestment due to other reasons. Likewise, the incentive
and eﬀect of such intervention appear to be stronger on ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁnance.
This study enriches the literature on government intervention and investment eﬃciency, providing empir-
ical evidence of the grabbing hand theory through the perspectives of local public ﬁnance and enterprise
investment, in addition to a new research perspective to apply to the problems of ﬁscal issues from the
ﬁrm-level view. In practice, we discover a relationship between local public ﬁnance and the investment behav-
ior of local SOEs, and provide theoretical bases and references for the ways in which local governments make
ﬁscal policies and improve the supervisory roles they have over local SOEs.
Appendix A
See Tables A1–A5.
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